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ABSTRACT

This study employs the method of transaction-cost
analysis - the price of doing business between economic and
political agents - to the study of Soviet-Western political
economy (particularly Soviet joint ventures with the West).
Its purpose is to determine:

(1)

if Soviet foreign

economic policy in the Gorbachev era has reduced the
transaction costs to Western firms engaging in joint
ventures with the Soviet Union when compared to previous
Western business options (e.g., co-production, licensing,
turn-key projects), and (2) if the reduction is sufficient
to encourage joint ventures to become a mechanism of
greater cooperation and liberalization in Soviet-Western
political economy and the international political economy
(IPE).
Survey data collected from 518 Western firms doing
business in the Soviet Union supports the theoretical
assumptions of the transaction-cost literature.

Empirical

analyis of the data demonstrates that the decision by a
Western firm to engage or not engage in a joint venture is
directly influenced by that firm's perception of the level
of transaction costs that would be incurred in such a
venture.

The study demonstrates that transaction-cost

analysis provides greater empirical verisimilitude than any
other existing IPE model for the study of Soviet-Western
political economy.
vii

CHAPTER ONE
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY?
By his own admission, Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev acknowledges that the Stalinist extensive
economic model has outlived its usefulness in the Soviet
Union.

Totalitarian taut planning, Gorbachev says, may

have hastened industrialization in the 1930s and
mobilization in the 1940s, but has become the "braking
mechanism" of the Soviet economy in the postwar era of
global interdependence and technological change (Gorbachev
1987:47).

The Soviet economy, which grew at an annual 10

percent rate in the 1950s, has slowed to approximately a
one percent annual growth rate in 1989 (Tedstrom 1990:2).
In an effort to halt and reverse this economic slowdown,
Gorbachev has embarked upon a program that calls for the
restructuring of existing institutions, investment
priorities, labor incentives, prices, and foreign trade
practices in the Soviet Union.
restructuring program is simple:

The reason for the radical
the Soviet economic

slowdown has placed the Soviet Union at the risk of being
permanently cast as a second-rate economic and political
power or what Jan Winecki (1989) calls a Permanently
Developing Country (PDC) in the international system.

A

concerted effort to reform the domestic economy of the
Soviet Union and improve its economic and political
relations with the West is in order to avoid the PDC label.
1

In September 1986, Gorbachev introduced legislation
that reorganized the foreign trade structure of the Soviet
Union with the goal of facilitating greater Soviet-Western
economic cooperation.

After a year in which the pace of

reform in the Soviet foreign trade system failed to meet
Gorbachev's expectations, the foreign trade bureaucracy was
reorganized and new legislation was issued with the hope of
strengthening Soviet economic ties with the West.

In

January 1987, after a period of approximately 60 years
during which Western firms were prohibited from owning an
equity interest in domestic Soviet firms, the Soviet Union
issued an edict entitled "On the Procedures Governing the
Creation, on USSR Territory, and the Activities of Joint
Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries" (Foreign
Trade 1987; ICC 1989).

The primary objective of the edict

is found in the first paragraph:
The resolution is aimed at further developing trade,
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with
the capitalist, and developing countries on a stable
and mutually advantageous basis.
This is a timely and important research topic because
Soviet joint ventures with the West are considered the
cornerstone of Gorbachev's foreign economic policy as he
attempts to reorganize the Soviet foreign trade system and
to integrate the Soviet Union into the international
political economy (IPE). The study will employ the concept
of "transaction-cost analysis" —

the price of doing

business between economic and political agents —

to the

study of Soviet joint ventures with the West to determine:
(1) if Soviet foreign economic policy in the Gorbachev era
has reduced the transaction costs to Western firms engaging
in foreign economic relations with the Soviet Union when
compared to previous Western business options in the Soviet
Union (e.g., co-production, licensing, turn-key projects),
and (2) if the reduction is sufficient to encourage joint
ventures to become a mechanism of greater cooperation and
liberalization in Soviet-Western economic and political
relations.
Currently, the literature on economic and political
cooperation in international trade (including SovietWestern trade issues) in the IPE subfield of international
politics is found within the context of three dominant
theories:

hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and

the theory of reciprocal cooperation.

The problem with

approaching Soviet-Western trade from these mainstream IPE
theoretical frameworks is that they are designed
specifically for the study of political and economic
relations between nations with well established,
functioning free market economies.

Attempting to apply

only these theories to Soviet-Western economic and
political relations is somewhat problematic because the
Soviet Union has yet to establish a functioning free market
economy.

In an effort to overcome the deficiencies of

these theories in explaining Soviet-Western economic and
political relations exclusively within the context of the
existing IPE theories, this study attempts to integrate a
relatively new theoretical framework to bear on the problem
of Soviet-Western trade to determine if Soviet joint
ventures have the potential to significantly effect SovietWestern economic and political relations.

Efforts to

provide an analytic and systematic explanation of Soviet
foreign economic policy and its impact on Soviet-Western
economic and political relations have become increasingly
important as major changes regularly occur in the
international system that make the IPE more competitive and
interdependent.

Transaction-cost analysis provides the

basis for not only examining the amount of overall trade
between the Soviet Union and the West in joint venture
arrangements, but can also explain the nature and impact of
these trading relationships.
The transaction-cost analysis developed in this study
will refine and expand the transaction-cost frameworks
currently employed in the study of international politics
and economics.

The basic foundation for transaction-cost

analysis in the study of international politics is found
within the political economy literature, particularly
literature on international regimes (see Baldwin 1985;
Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1988; Yarbrough and Yarbrough
1987a and 1987b). In the field of economics, transaction-

cost economics is a product of the subfield known as
"institutional economics" or the "new economics of
organization" (NEO), which is based on the work of such
economists as Ronald Coase (1960), John Commons (1950),
Geoffrey Hodgson (1988), and Oliver Williamson (1985 and
1986).

However, Robert Keohane argues that transaction-

cost analysis is "not a substitute for a power-oriented or
interdependence position (a.k.a., international politics),
but is rather a supplement to these "traditional modes of
political analysis" (Keohane 1990:746).
This study will offer a description of NEO and
transaction-cost analysis and an examination of their
theoretical connection and importance to international
politics and Soviet-Western political economy.

The primary

purpose of this study, however, is to conduct empirical
tests using survey data to determine if the decision by
Western firms to engage in Soviet joint ventures is the
direct or indirect result of the reduction of the
transaction costs involved in Soviet-Western political
economy brought about by the implementation of the Soviet
joint venture law, and if the reduction is sufficient to
encourage joint ventures to become a mechanism of greater
cooperation in Soviet-Western political economy.

The dissertation is organized as follows:

Chapter Two

examines the game theoretic context of international trade.
Because international trade is widely assumed to have the
payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma, that concept is
briefly reviewed and analyzed as applied to international
trade.

Chapter Two also examines the different factors

postulated as causing the prisoner's dilemma dimension of
international trade.

This chapter identifies different

factors associated with the two major paradigms of IPE,
neorealism and pluralism, and their application to SovietWestern trade.

In addition to identifying the different

obstacles emphasized by neorealism and pluralism, this
chapter also presents an overview of each paradigm and
examines the three dominant theories of international trade
found in the IPE literature:

hegemonic stability theory,

regime theory, and the theory of reciprocal cooperation.
The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate
that the problem with approaching Soviet-Western trade
exclusively from these mainstream IPE theoretical
frameworks is that they are designed specifically for the
study of political and economic cooperation between nations
with established, functioning free market economies.
Chapter Three examines NEO and transaction-cost
analysis.

In this chapter, the conceptual framework of

transaction-cost analysis is placed within the context of
the international politics literature examined in Chapter

Two and the framework is applied to the problem of SovietWestern trade within the context of the IPE.

Chapter Three

also offers a descriptive analysis of the primary
transaction costs of Soviet-Western political economy,
which provides the basis for an analysis of Soviet joint
ventures with the West.
Chapter Four begins by developing a model of Soviet
joint ventures with the West that permits a test to
determine whether transaction costs directly or indirectly
affect Western business firms* decision to engage or not
engage in a joint venture project in the USSR.

The data

for this study come from a survey of both Western firms
engaged in Soviet joint ventures and Western firms not
engaged in Soviet joint ventures but who are conducting
other business arrangements with the Soviet Union.

The

survey information was compiled and coded into a data set
in order to test the following model and research
hypothesis (see Figure 1):
Model:

SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2 (INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4 (WESTPOL) + b5 (SOP) + e

SJV:

The Western firm's decision to engage or not
engage in a joint venture in the Soviet
Union.

TAC:

The Western firm's perception of the level
of transaction costs that may be incurred
by engaging in a Soviet joint venture.

INTBUS:

The Western firm's perception of the level
of business and strategic planning risks
involved in engaging or not engaging in
a Soviet joint venture.

SOVPOL:

The Western firm's perception of the Soviet
political climate.

SOP:

The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Soviet government policy on their
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet
joint venture.

WESTPOL:

The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Western government policy on their
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet
joint venture.

Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
In order to test both the relative contribution of the
variables introduced above and their predictive power in a
multivariate context, logistic regression will be employed
with the decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture (SJV) as the dependent variable and TAC, INTBUS,
SOVPOL, SOP, and WESTPOL as the independent variables.
There are a few notable similarities between formal
procedures, goals, and interpretations in logistic
regression and analysis employing the "classic" regression
model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989:1-24, but when a dependent
variable is dichotomous (e.g., SJV), logistic regression
analysis is preferred.

The use of the classical regression

model in such instances may lead to:
. . . serious misestimate(s) in the magnitude ofthe
effects of the independent variables . . . all of the
standard statistical inferences such as hypotheses
tests or the construction of confidence intervals are
unjustified and the regression estimates will be
highly sensitive to the range of particular values

observed for the independent variables - thus making
extrapolations or forecasts beyond the range of the
data especially unjustified (Aldrich and Nelson
1984:9-10).
The goal of an analysis employing logistic regression
is the same as that of any model building technique used in
statistics:

"to find the best fitting and most

parsimonious model to describe the relationship between the
dependent (outcome) variable and a set of independent
(predictor or explanatory) variables" (Hosmer and Lemeshow
1989:1).

Since SJV is a dichotomous dependent variable and

the goal of the study is an understanding of the dynamics
involved in the decision by a Western firm to engage or not
engage in a Soviet joint venture, logistic regression is
appropriate for an investigation of this nature.
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a
"new world order," the study of Soviet-Western political
economy is found to be theoretically lacking.

This study

attempts to overcome the void by providing new theoretical
and empirical insights on one specific aspect of SovietWestern political economy:
West.

Soviet joint ventures with the

Figure 1
Soviet Join t V entures Model
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JOINT VENTURES IN THE CHANGING SOVIET POLITICAL ECONOMY

When this study began the Soviet Union under
the leadership of President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to
be moving toward a free market economy and complete
integration of the Soviet Union into the international
political economy (IPE). However, by the summer of 1990
numerous events transpired in the Soviet Union that
appeared to change the direction of Gorbachev's program of
perestroika, which, inturn, raised questions about the
relevance of this study and the future of Soviet joint
ventures.

This section will briefly recount some of these

events and demonstrate that the results of this study and
transaction-cost analysis are still valid despite the
current Soviet political and social climate.
In July 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in
negotiations with Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian
Republic, on the Shatalin Plan.

The Shatalin Plan was a

500 day economic program to transform the
stagnant/declining Soviet command economy to a free market
by selling off all state enterprises (e.g., factories and
farms), letting prices reflect relative scarcity through
supply and demand, promoting private enterprise, and
facilitating the "devolution of power to the republics in
exchange for their participation in a kind of economic
commonwealth" (New York Times. February 3, 1991).

However,

following a brief vacation, Gorbachev returned to Moscow

offering a different, far less sweeping plan.

It appeared

the restraining influence of the Communist Party, the KGB,
and the Army was a major factor in Gorbachev's reversal.
The Communist Party, while issuing disclaimers regarding
its monopoly on power in the Soviet government, still
maintains

a strong influence in all institutions of the

central government.

In addition, Gorbachev could not

afford to further alienate the KGB and the Army, already
upset by what they perceived to be Soviet security
concessions to the West, with domestic protests increasing
throughout the Soviet Union.

These organizations might be

needed to preserve the Soviet Union and its leader,
President Mikhail Gorbachev.
The events of the summer of 1990 were followed by a
series of personnel changes in the Soviet government and
cabinet which appeared to reflect a policy of retrenchment
by Gorbachev.

The appointments of Valentin S. Pavlov to

the post of Prime Minister, and Boris Pugo to the post of
Interior Minister, and the nomination of Gennadi Yanayev as
Vice-President of the Soviet Union by Gorbachev saw the
reemergence of Communist Party conservatives in key
positions of Soviet government.

In addition, the

unexpected resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze in December 1990, because he feared the
possibility of dictatorship, further demonstrated that
Gorbachev might be aligning himself more with the

conservatives in the Communist Party, the KGB, and the
Soviet Army.

In addition, the "brain thrust of

perestroika," Aleksandr Yakolev, Stanislav Shatalin,
Nikolai Petrakov, and Vadim Bakatin, had either resigned or
have been demoted and delegated little responsibility in
the Soviet government (New York Times. January 27, 1991).
The reasons for this realignment included the need to
insure (1) the survival of Mikhail Gorbachev as President
of the Soviet Union and leader of the Communist Party, and
(2) the support and control of the security forces of the
Soviet Union to preserve the union in the face of strong
independence movements throughout the 15 republics.
When considering the guestion of perestroika or
retrenchment by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the most
significant of all events has been the appointment of
Valentin Pavlov as Prime Minister.

Since Pavlov has

assumed the position of Prime Minister, Soviet policy,
especially policy that has a direct bearing on foreign
economic relations, has gone through a definite period of
retrenchment.

The first major policy change implemented by

Pavlov was the withdrawal of 50 and 100 ruble notes from
circulation, approximately 33 percent of the currency in
circulation in the Soviet Union.

The decree ordering the

withdrawal, the first major act implemented by Gorbachev's
new Cabinet of Ministers, stated the measure was designed
to bring the Soviet economy and black market under control
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by reducing "speculation, corruption, smuggling, forgery,
unearned income, and normalizing the monetary situation and
the consumer market" (New York Times. January 23, 1991).
In February 1991, following negative public reaction to the
measure, Pavlov attempted to justify the law by accusing
banks in Switzerland, Austria, and Canada of plotting to
(1) acquire billions of rubles on the black market, (2)
flood the Soviet economy with these rubles in order to
create hyperinflation and cause greater economic panic
throughout the Soviet Union, and (3) overthrow Gorbachev in
order to bring an end to Communist Party rule in the Soviet
Union.
While Pavlov's actions may have diminished Soviet
public outrage with the ruble withdrawal policy it may have
alienated the Soviet government from Western financial
institutions.

The importance of this alienation is best

described by an article in The Economist (February 16,
1991):
He [Pavlov] heads the government of a country with a
recent history of unpaid trade obligations, rising
foreign debt, and falling export revenues. Many
bankers (Western) fear that the Soviet Union may have
to reschedule its foreign debt in 1991 or 1992. In
these circumstances, accusing Western banks of
criminality risks undermining his own government's
negotiating credibility. Some parts of the economy,
especially the energy industry, urgently need Western
investment . . . Yet Mr. Pavlov's welcome for foreign
investment was distinctly cool.

The second retrenchment policy change implemented by
Gorbachev, Pavlov, and the Cabinet of Ministers was the
expansion of the role of the KGB in policing private
enterprise, including Soviet joint ventures with the West.
Pavlov suggested that these enterprises, especially the
joint ventures with the West, were tools of the black
market and contributed greatly to the stagnation of the
Soviet economy.

This Soviet policy change was not well

received by Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures.
An interview with an official of a Memphis medical firm
involved in a Soviet joint venture (name of official and
company withheld at request of company), suggested that any
interference and intimidation by the KGB could cause their
company to reconsider its business relationship with the
Soviet Union.

The company official stated that the

retrenchment policies taken by the Soviet government could
raise the company's cost of doing business to such a level
that profits may not be attainable anytime in the near
future.

In particular, he suggested that the new policies

could make repatriation of profits more difficult and would
give the Soviet government greater control over the
operation of the joint venture, which the company official
suggested would result in greater inefficiency as well as
other business and production problems.

He also stated

that the referendum on March 17 was another key factor
concerning their future business relations with the Soviet
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Union as well as other Western firms' further business
relations with the Soviet Union.

It appears that Western

investors viewed the referendum as an indicator of the
future of reform and economic liberalization in the Soviet
Union; thus its failure would have forced the central
government in Moscow to implement even stronger
retrenchment policies causing the further deterioration of
the Soviet political economy resulting in the potential
loss of Western investors in the Soviet economy.
On the other hand, support for the future of SovietWestern political economy, Soviet joint ventures with the
West, and this study can be found in the legislation
enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the parliaments of
the various republics in conjunction with decrees by
Gorbachev.

Sarah Carey (1991:38) states:

The USSR is on the verge of a new era of foreign
investment. The door to this vast market is no longer
partially ajar; it is wide open. Foreign companies
are no longer constrained to a narrow path, for they
can go virtually anywhere in the Soviet economy, both
geographically (with limited exceptions related to the
vestiges of the Cold War) and in terms of the forms
their investments take. While the centralized
ministries and other state organizations still exist
and still want to serve as the "channelers" or
"handlers" of foreign investors, they are becoming
increasingly irrelevant. The informed foreign
investor now starts with the customer or the potential
partner, not the customer's or partner's superior
organization. The enterprise is now the basic
building block in foreign trade. Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev has promulgated decrees emphasizing
the importance of foreign trade to overall economic
development, and this policy is reflected in a number
of USSR Supreme Soviet enactments as well as in
proposed and current legislation of the Russian
Republic.

On June 4, 1990, the "Law on Enterprises in the USSR"
(effective January 1, 1991) was passed by the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR.

The law officially sanctioned and

guaranteed the rights of several new (new to the Soviet
economy) business forms such as corporations, partnerships,
and cooperatives (Carey 1991).

However, the key provision

of the law allows foreigners to be the founders of
enterprises and grants those enterprises independence in
decisionmaking from the central bureaucracy.

In addition,

on October 26, 1990 Gorbachev issued a Presidential Decree
that authorized 100 percent foreign ownership of
enterprises in the Soviet Union.

The door for direct

foreign investment in the Soviet Union was now "wide open"
and Western firms responded by engaging in more joint
ventures.

Between September 1, 1990, and March 1, 1991 the

number of joint ventures in the Soviet Union rose
approximately 42 percent.
Sarah Carey (1991) suggests that the explanation for
the increase in Soviet joint ventures is relatively simple.
She (1991:39) argues that "joint ventures are a proven,
established business form in the USSR as in most of the
world" and that joint ventures are "a better vehicle for
locking in key partners whose involvement is crucial,
because they control either natural resources, a customer
network, real property, or some other asset."

In addition,

Carey states that Western "business can survive and even
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thrive despite intergovernmental conflicts."

The empirical

findings of this study support Carey's conclusions, as
demonstrated in Chapter Four.
The procedure initially set forth by the January 1987
edict for the establishment of joint ventures was
complicated and unclear.

The 1987 edict was only five

pages long, providing a loose framework that limited
foreign firms to owning no more than 49 percent of the
joint venture and leaving the majority of the key decisions
to the discretion of the joint venture's partners and
governing boards.

But under recently enacted amendments to

the joint venture law and the aforementioned Presidential
Decree issued in October, foreign firms are permitted to be
the majority partner.

It is entirely possible that a

Soviet joint venture with a Western firm could be 100
percent owned by a Western firm, controlled under its
charter by citizens of the home country of the Western
firm, and operated on a day to day basis by Western
capitalist managers.
Four years later, the Soviet Ministry of Finance (the
ministry responsible for the registration of Soviet joint
ventures with the West) reports that 2375 joint ventures
have been registered as of March 1, 1991.

Soviet joint

ventures have been established in almost every industry:
energy, natural resources, food processing, chemical
production, engineering services, telecommunications,

19

transportation, tourism, consumer products, computers, and
heavy industry (e.g., machinery) (Carey 1991).

Carey

(1990) argues that joint ventures "have demonstrated that,
although the path to success is arduous, foreign investors
can prosper and can have positive effects on the economy .
. . and have served as demonstration projects for many of
the current economic reforms."
While political conflicts between conservatives and
liberals continue in the Soviet Union, the overview above
suggests that the compete integration of the Soviet economy
into the IPE is a policy objective of both political
factions in order to prevent the Soviet Union from being
labeled as a permanently developing country (PDC) and
thereby diminishing its status as an international
superpower.

The theoretical discussion of NEO and

transaction costs presented in Chapter 3 and the empirical
analysis of the Soviet joint, venture model will demonstrate
that this study, the theoretical assumptions, and the model
are still appropriate research tools because, despite the
political conflict in the Soviet Union, economic reform
continues to move in the direction of greater
liberalization and integration.

Soviet government policies

and legislation that directly affect the Soviet economy
have not been interrupted by the political conflict, as
previously noted, this is especially true for economic
policies and legislation that affect Soviet joint ventures.

But the Soviet Union, like the NEO world, is still a
world where, for example, "individuals are only bounded
rationally, legal enforcement of agreements is costly and
imperfect, and opportunistic acts cannot be ruled out"
(Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:239).

This makes cooperation

difficult, "even when all parties are acting in good faith,
and it therefore creates a demand for norms to enhance
predictability and political and economic institutions to
support exchange and other forms of cooperation" (Yarbrough
and Yarbrough 1990:240).

Uncertainty can also be increased

if actors are engaging in opportunistic behavior, strategic
behavior that is designed to deliberately conceal an
actor's preferences or actions in order to achieve gains
that improves its position while threatening the welfare
and utility of other actors (Hodgson 1988:37-40).
Obviously, the facts suggest that the Soviet Union meets
the criteria necessary for NEO and transaction-cost
analysis.

Therefore, a study of Soviet joint ventures with

the West is relevant and important for understanding the
Soviet-Western political economy, and to the larger
international political economy.

CHAPTER TWO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, COOPERATION, AND THEORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

This study will integrate a relatively new
theoretical framework within the existing IPE theories to
bear on the problem of Soviet-Western trade to determine if
Soviet joint ventures with the West have the potential to
significantly affect Soviet-Western economic and political
relations.

But in order to introduce a new theoretical

framework on Soviet-Western trade it is necessary to
examine the existing theoretical frameworks on
international trade that dominant the field of
international politics and why they are deficient for
purposes of understanding Soviet-Western trade relations.
Currently, the literature on economic and political
cooperation in international trade (including SovietWestern trade) in the IPE subfield of international
politics is found within the context of three dominant
theories that evolve from the neorealist and pluralist
paradigms:

hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and

the theory of reciprocal cooperation.

This chapter

presents an overview of each paradigm and examines the
three dominant theories of international trade.

In

addition, it demonstrates that the problem with approaching
Soviet-Western trade from these mainstream IPE theoretical
frameworks is that they are designed specifically for the
study of political and economic cooperation between nations
21
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with established, functioning free market economies.
Therefore, attempts to apply only these theories to SovietWestern trade is somewhat problematic because the Soviet
Union has yet to establish a functioning market economy.
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

The benefits of free international trade have long
been promoted by classical and neo-classical economics (or
liberalism). Liberalism teaches that since wealth is
fundamentally a function of the extent of division of labor
and scale of the market, states can increase their welfare
(income or wealth) through specialization and trade
according to comparative advantage.

Yet, despite the

potential benefits of economic cooperation, the historical
record clearly shows that states often prefer forms of
protectionism to liberal international trade (Conybeare
1987).

Both the neorealist and pluralist schools explain

non-cooperation and the breakdown of international trade by
reference to the game theoretical model of the prisoner's
dilemma.

The prisoner's dilemma is a situation in which

two actors can achieve mutual gain through cooperation, but
often fail to achieve cooperation because each actor's
payoff derived from taking advantage of the other's
cooperation is greater than the payoff from mutual
cooperation (Oye 1985).
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What factors give international trade the
characteristics of a prisoner's dilemma?

Although

neorealists and pluralists both tend to accept the notion
that international trade presents states with a prisoner's
dilemma scenario, their differing theoretical assumptions
lead them to postulate somewhat different variables as
contributing to the problems posed by the prisoner's
dilemma.
NEOREALISM, PLURALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Neorealism, International Trade, and Cooperation
Neorealist analysis begins with the assumption that
the essential characteristic of the international system is
the competition for power and security among states.

This

competitive nature of international relations is an
inherent trait produced by the anarchic structure of the
international system (Waltz 1979:76-77).

Under anarchy no

sovereign authority exists to ensure the survival and
security of individual states.

Thus, the primary concern

of states is to develop the means to provide for their
security (Waltz 1979:111).
Neorealist theory posits that the state's primary
concern for security limits cooperation in two ways.
States must worry about economic independence and
maintaining a diversified economy (Waltz 1979:106-107).
Free international trade, according to liberal economic

theory, causes states to specialize in the production and
trade of goods in which they have a comparative advantage.
Neorealists argue that while a state may increase its
national income through specialization in international
trade according to comparative advantage in the short-run,
in the long-run broader national security interests place
limits on specialization.

States have an interest in

developing and maintaining a diversified and structurally
competitive and efficient economy, and to a achieve this
objective states frequently intervene in the market through
the use of subsidies and protectionist measures.
Neorealists argue that specialization offers at least
five potential long-run costs to the welfare and security
of the individual states.

First, some economic sectors,

such as steel and food, are strategically important because
they are vital to military preparedness and national
survival.

States which fail to develop these strategically

important sectors or to let them decline become vulnerable
to the possibility of trade embargoes and massive shortages
during periods of international conflict.

Second,

specialization may cause a state to suffer serious economic
losses if the demand for its goods falls unexpectedly.
Third, a state that is competitive in a wide range of goods
has considerable economic leverage, which can enable the
state to improve its terms of trade during periods of
negotiation with other states (Knorr 1977; Yarbrough and

Yarbrough 1986).

Fourth, economic leverage can also

provide a state greater political leverage in the IPE,
which can result in the achievement of security and other
political objectives in international regimes such as the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).

Finally, industrial and high

technology sectors must be promoted over the primary
product sectors if the market does not encourage the
development of those sectors because industry and
technology have positive spill over effects that enhance
the long-run economic welfare of the state and provide it
with a technologically more sophisticated and powerful
military (Gilpin 1987:32-33).
The second way in which anarchy constrains
international cooperation is that the pursuit of security
forces states to be "defensively positional" actors in
their economic relations with other states (Greico 1988).
Defensive positionality applies to actors whose fundamental
goal is not to maximize their own absolute gains, but "to
prevent others from achieving advances in their relative
capabilities" (Greico 1988:490).

In other words,

neorealists argue that states want economic cooperation to
preserve or enhance their relative power and security visa-vis other states, especially rivals.

According to Greico

(1988:492), neorealists assume that to achieve this
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objective a state will many times "decline to join . . .
leave, or . . . sharply limit its commitment to a
cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are
achieving, or are likely to achieve relatively greater
gains."
In summary, neorealism postulates that, in their
economic relations, states strive to maximize a utility
function that is dependent not only upon increases in their
own payoffs but also on the maintenance of a diversified
and structurally competitive economy and on a favorable
distribution of the benefits that cooperation affords.
Intuitively one perceives that the proposition that states
are defensively positional renders free trade problematic
to the extent that states are not merely concerned with
increasing their own payoffs but with avoiding relative
losses in the distribution of trade gains.

Consequently,

free trade becomes less likely and the probability of the
prisoner's dilemma outcome of mutual defection increases.
Pluralism, International Trade, and Cooperation
Pluralists begin their analysis with the basic
assumption that the essential characteristic of the
contemporary IPE is that of complex interdependence.
Complex interdependence is a condition in which states have
both security and economic interests, and in which the
latter are not necessarily subordinate to the former
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(Keohane and Nye 1988:24-25).

Therefore, the condition of

complex interdependence implies that states' interests in
cooperation are as strong as their interest in competition.
Complex interdependence is defined as a network of
crisis crossing relationships that have the potential to be
both costly and beneficial to actors in the international
system (Keohane and Nye 1988:23).

While neorealism views

states as the only important actors in the international
system, pluralism assumes that a variety of non-state
actors are linked in ways that may be important to
international relations.

The behavior of non-state actors

may affect outcomes directly, as when a powerful
multinational bank decides whether to make loans to
developing nations and when multinational corporations
(MNCs) turn from a strategy of horizontal integration to
vertical integration (Gilpin 1987:254-256).
Pluralists stress that sub-state and non-state actors
influence international relations indirectly through their
impact on state policy.

Unlike the defensively positional

argument of neorealism, pluralism assumes that under the
conditions of complex interdependence states are fragmented
actors whose policies reflect the interests of sub-state
and non-state actors.

The state's economic policy is

assumed to be the product of the relative power and
political pressure of various interest groups.

Interest

groups include domestic coalitions, transnational actors

28

such as MNCs and transgovernmental coalitions (Keohane and
Nye 1988:30-32).

Thus, the state is not, on most economic

issues, a coherent unitary actor that necessarily pursues
security over wealth as neorealists suggest.
Pluralism, however, does acknowledge the realist
distinction between "high politics" (military and security
issues) and "low politics" (economic and other issues) and
accepts that with respect to certain security issues
realism's assumptions may be accurate.

Yet, in economic

matters, pluralism is not satisfied with explanations that
link international cooperation to the power and security
concerns of states.

Explicit in pluralism is the idea that

modern technology, modern forms of socioeconomic
organizations (e.g., transnational capitalism), and modern
forms of political organization have altered the character
of international relations.

In the contemporary

international system, pluralists expect that the state's
economic policies will be shaped as often by its relations
with non-state actors and by economic forces as by its
relations with other states and its military and strategic
interests.
Because pluralism regards the international system as
a complex environment and state policy as a product of
complex forces, pluralists have identified a wide variety
of factors that constitute impediments to international
trade.

For example, workers and certain domestic

industries whose incomes may be threatened by foreign
economic competition often use their political power to
pressure their government to enact tariffs or other non
tariff protectionist measures that will reduce the
competitiveness of foreign goods in the domestic market
(Friman 1988).

On the other hand, MNCs, perceiving their

interests to be best served by economic liberalism
(openness), are likely to pressure policy makers to reduce
tariffs and other non-tariff protectionist measures (Milner
1988).

A corollary of the idea that domestic and

transnational interests affect state economic policy is the
notion that the particular institutional structure of a
state, and the degree to which its institutions enable
particular interest groups to influence economic policy,
will be a major determinant of a state's trade policy (Lake
1988) .
Finally, pluralism often traces protectionist policies
to macroeconomic conditions such as surplus capacity,
business cycles, and global economic instability (Calleo
1982; McKeown 1983; Strange and Tooze 1984; Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1987a). Whereas neorealism emphasizes the
distribution of overall military and economic capabilities
as a determinant of outcomes in international relations,
pluralism examines the distribution of capabilities across
particular issue areas and sectors in an effort to
understand the international system.

This is necessary
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because on issues involving complex interdependence overall
military and economic power is not usually an effective
instrument of foreign policy.

In other words, broad based

military and economic power is no longer fungible in the
modern international system.
Pluralists posit that any number of economic or
domestic political factors may influence state policy in
ways that exacerbate the prisoner's dilemma aspect of
international trade and thereby inhibit cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade.

Yet to list a

series of pluralist impediments to international trade is
perhaps to overemphasize the causes of non-cooperation
within pluralism and neorealism on the broader issue of
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
In simplest terms cooperation is much more the norm for
pluralism than for neorealism.

This is evident from the

fact that neorealist theories of international political
economy are fundamentally theories of non-cooperation.
Neorealism stresses that distributional conflict over the
gains from international trade is ever present in
international political economy and that this conflict
continually makes free international trade problematic.
While pluralism, on the other hand, has identified specific
factors leading to non-cooperation, it has also developed
explicit theories of cooperation.

As shall be illustrated

next, when the three dominant theories of international

trade found in the IPE literature are examined, the
conditions that must be met for cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade to emerge and be
sustained are much less stringent in pluralist theories of
international cooperation than in the theories of
international cooperation that are consistent with basic
neorealist assumptions.
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Although the historical record documents a great deal
of protectionism it also chronicles periods of sustained
cooperation among states.

Indeed, liberal world economies

have been predominant in the modern era (Krasner 1976).
While both neorealism and pluralism have sought to
understand when and how sustained international economic
cooperation occurs, they have also sought to understand
when and how sustained international economic cooperation
is possible given the prisoner's dilemma aspect of economic
relations.

In general, three basic theories have dominated

the massive body of IPE literature of the last two decades:
hegemonic stability theory, regime theory, and the theory
of reciprocal cooperation.

Hegemonic stability theory is

usually emphasized by neorealists, while regime theory and
the theory of reciprocal cooperation are usually emphasized
by pluralists.
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Hegemonic Stability Theory
Hegemonic stability theory emerged in the early 1970s
and remains a widely accepted and influential account of
international economic cooperation and free trade regimes.
Hegemonic stability theory maintains that a "hegemonic
power is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient condition for
the full development of a world market economy" (Gilpin
1987:86).

In part, a hegemon promotes free international

trade by providing certain financial and monetary functions
such as serving as a "lender of last resort" and
maintaining stable international exchange rates
(Kindleberger 1973, 1983).

More importantly, however, the

hegemon promotes free international trade through its power
to bribe states that would otherwise prefer protection to
liberal international trade.

In this situation, the

hegemon overcomes the prisoner's dilemma aspect of trade by
making side payments or trade concessions that induce
states, which would otherwise choose protectionism, to
pursue free international trade (Yarbrough and Yarbrough
1987a). Once free international trade has been
established, the sizeable gains that states realize from
trading on the hegemon's large domestic market enable the
hegemon to use the threat that it will close its market as
an additional efficacious enforcement mechanism for keeping
the IPE open (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987a).
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Given the emphasis neorealism places on the obstacles
to trade, hegemonic stability theory is the best and
perhaps the only theory of cooperation that is fully
compatible with neorealism's theory of non-cooperation.
Given the relative gain problem that exists among
defensively positional units, a hegemonic power is
necessary to pay bribes and coerce states that feel that
they would lose in relative terms from cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, hegemonic
stability theory became the object of increasing criticism.
The continued operation of the liberal IPE in the face of
what appeared to most observers as hegemonic decline on the
part of the United States led researchers to examine more
closely the empirical and theoretical validity of hegemonic
stability theory.

The result was the discovery of

significant empirical evidence that appeared to contradict
the hegemonic stability hypotheses that (1) widespread and
sustained economic cooperation is unlikely in the absence
of a hegemon, and (2) hegemonic systems are more open than
non-hegemonic systems (Gilpin 1987:91).
Neither cross-sectional nor time series analysis
reveals a strong relationship between hegemony and openness
in international trade (Conybeare 1984).

Stephen Krasner

(1976) demonstrated that openness and closure in trade in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not correspond
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closely with the rise and decline of British and American
hegemony.

In particular, liberal international trade

appears to continue to prevail for a considerable period of
time after a hegemon has begun to decline.

Although

British hegemonic decline was marked by a modest closure of
the IPE during the last two decades of the 19th century,
the years 1900-13 (clearly years of marked British
hegemonic decline) were ones of increasing openness
(Krasner 1976:357).

Similarly, despite the fact that non

tariff and other forms of protectionism have clearly
increased over the last two decades and that managed and
strategic trade is on the rise, trade has remained
remarkably open during the period of declining United
States hegemony (Nye 1990:143-145).

Trade actually

continued to expand until the 1982 world recession (Strange
1985).

In sum, hegemonic decline does not, as hegemonic

stability theory suggests, necessarily mean closure of the
IPE.
Regime Theory
In the 1970s, regime theory emerged to explain the
fact that the liberal IPE was persisting despite the
apparent erosion of U.S. hegemony.

The regime literature

flourished in the 1980s, as international political
economists sought to explore the utility of institutions in
achieving and maintaining cooperation in the international

system (Krasner 1983:2-3).

This approach to institutions

has relied upon the neoclassical analogy, and has focused
on the collective action/public goods approach, emphasizing
the importance of enforcement, commitment, and strategic
interactions for international cooperation (Keohane
1984:7-9; Oye 1986).

Employing these various approaches in

the field of international politics illustrates the
importance of transaction costs (e.g., uncertainty and
information) in achieving international economic and
security cooperation.

Regime theory argues that regimes,

defined as norms, principles, and rules around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue area, may serve as
an intervening or independent variable in promoting
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
Although regimes may have their roots in a particular
distribution of power, regimes may persist and promote
continuing cooperation even after the underlying
distribution of power that gave rise to the regimes has
changed.

Therefore, regime theory attempts to explain how

the liberal IPE could continue to function in the 1970s and
1980s even though U.S. hegemony was in decline.
Robert Keohane (1984:85-97) argues that regimes
facilitate cooperation in the IPE by reducing the
transaction costs that normally result in market failure
and externalities.

Keohane states:
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Market failure refers to situations in which outcomes
of market-mediated interactions are suboptimal given
the utility functions of actors and the resources at
their disposal. That is agreements that would be
beneficial to all parties are not made. . . . In
situations of market failure the difficulties are
attributed not to inadequacies of the actors
themselves (who are assumed to be rational utility
maximizers), but rather to the structure of the system
and the institutions, or lack thereof, that
characterize it. Specific attributes of the system
impose transaction costs that create barriers to
effective cooperation among the actors. Thus
institutional defects are responsible for failures of
coordination. To correct these defects, conscious
institutional innovation (e.g., international regimes
and joint ventures) may be necessary (1984:82-83).
Externalities occur when "one actor A, in the course
of rendering some service to a second actor B, incidentally
also renders services or disservices to other persons . . .
of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted from the
benefitted parties or compensation enforced on behalf of
the injured parties" (Head 1974:185).

Ronald Coase (i960)

and Robert Keohane (1984:85-86) offer the classic example
of an externality:

the paint factory and the laundry

service next door.

In the course of producing their paint,

the factory generates emissions that settle on clothes hung
to dry in the yard of the neighboring laundry.

The smoke

dirties the clothes, and the cleaner must relaunder them.
The laundry has no possible means of avoiding the smoke,
and is not compensated for its detrimental effect.

The

factory has seemingly no incentive for reducing smoke
output, nor for compensating the laundry for the costs of
rewashing the clothes.

To correct the externality, the
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cost to the laundry must somehow be incorporated into the
factory's production costs.

Externalities and market

failure arise in the IPE as a result of the transaction
costs that create barriers to political and economic
cooperation among actors in the system.

Keohane argues

that "international regimes perform the valuable functions
of reducing the costs of legitimate transactions, while
increasing the costs of illegitimate ones, and of reducing
uncertainty" (1984:107).
While regime theory introduces the transaction-cost
framework to the study of international politics,
attempting to apply regime theory to a detailed analysis of
Soviet-Western political economy is problematic for two
reasons.

First, regime theory is designed specifically to

study and explain the continuing existence of a Western
dominated international trading system in age of apparent
declining United States hegemony.

Second, regime theory is

inherently difficult to put to empirical tests, a
difficulty that is compounded by the problem of pinpointing
the exact moment when hegemony has eroded to a sufficient
degree that regimes alone are the sustaining force of
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
The Theory of Reciprocal Cooperation
Recently, a third explanation for continuing
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade in

an era of hegemonic decline has emerged.

This explanation

has its origins in the game theoretical analysis of Robert
Axelrod (1984).

Instead of focusing directly on regimes as

independent variables explaining cooperation, this theory
of cooperation in the liberalization of international trade
uses game theoretic analysis to explain the way in which
regimes emerge and are maintained.

This analysis implies

that cooperation in the liberalization of international
trade may be established and maintained spontaneously when
economic and other conditions are favorable, even in the
absence of regimes.
Robert Axelrod (1984) has shown that in situations
where actors (or players to use his terminology) expect to
continue to play the prisoner's dilemma game, a tit-for-tat
strategy tends to dominate as long as the players can
communicate and do not discount the future too heavily.
Under these conditions players will ordinarily cooperate
contingent on the other players cooperating on the
subsequent play.

Thus, on the surface, Axelrod's analysis

suggests that the continuous nature of international trade
relations can encourage cooperation based on reciprocity.
From this theoretical perspective the primary threats to
cooperation are the domestic economic and political factors
that were discussed in the previous section on pluralist
impediments to free international trade.

Changes in these

variables may alter the payoff structure or change the
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interests of actors in ways that encourage opportunistic
defection.
Theoretical Differences Between Neorealism and Pluralism
and the Problem of Soviet-Western Trade
Neorealists have been quick to criticize the pluralist
argument that reciprocity can be a basis for sustained
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade.
Because states are assumed to be defensively positional,
neorealists find that the concepts of reciprocity and titfor-tat are inadequate to sustain cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade (Greico 1988).
Neorealists point out that Axelrod's analysis rests on the
assumption that actors are egoistic.

Egoistic actors have

the primary objective of maximizing their absolute utility
and gain irrespective of the gain of other actors.

As has

been illustrated, neorealists assume that states strive not
to maximize their absolute gain in international economic
relations but to preserve their relative positions vis-avis other states, thus making states defensively positional
rather than egoistic (Greico 1988; Stein 1984).
The basis of cooperation among defensively positional
units is not tit-for-tat but rather an equitable
distribution of gains among cooperating parties, a
distribution that while sustaining economic growth also
roughly preserves the existing position of states within
the IPE.

Since there is no reason to assume that

reciprocity will necessarily produce equitable gains that
preserve the existing distribution of power, reciprocity
alone is not a sufficient condition of cooperation in
liberalization of international trade or more specifically
Soviet-Western trade.

Indeed, if equity is the basis for

cooperation, reciprocity might be harmful to cooperation in
the liberalization of international trade, particularly
Soviet-Western trade, because reciprocity requires
retaliation against all forms of protectionism whereas
equity often requires toleration of most measures of
protectionism.
Reciprocity may be effective for preventing
opportunistic protectionism, protectionism that seeks not
to achieve such equitable distribution of gains from trade
but rather to achieve such great gains as improve a state's
position and threatens the domestic and strategic welfare
of that state's trading partner.

But reciprocity alone

cannot assure equity given the free functioning of the
international market.

To be consistent with neorealism, a

theory of non-hegemonic cooperation must recognize that
cooperation is based not just on reciprocity but also on
arrangements that ensure an equitable distribution of
international trade among states.

In other words,

hegemonic type functions that ensure equity are seen as a
necessary condition for the sustained functioning of the
liberal IPE.

Those states that gain in relative terms from
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trade must be willing and able to make concessions to the
losers, concessions that take the place of hegemonic bribes
in keeping international trade open.

Therefore, some other

mechanism that provides equity must supplement reciprocity
for a liberal IPE to prevail among defensively positional
units.
It must be noted that reciprocity alone as a basis of
sustained cooperation in the liberalization of
international trade is theoretically problematic for
pluralism as well.
is pluralistic.

First, pluralism assumes that the state

If state policy reflects a pluralistic

struggle among competing interests then that policy will
not always be egoistic (e.g., will not always aim to
maximize national income). Rather, overall national
welfare will sometimes be subordinated in the interest of
maximizing or protecting the interests and income of
particular industries and other groups.

In addition,

reciprocity clearly does not provide an adequate
explanation of trade outcomes in the contemporary era.
Increasingly free international trade has been replaced by
"fair trade" as states negotiate a network of voluntary
export restraints and other agreements that essentially
allocate certain shares of markets to particular states and
thereby distribute international trade gains more equitably
than might the free international market (Gilpin 1987:204228).

States have exhibited a willingness to tolerate
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protectionism on the part of their trade partners in
certain sectors in exchange for the partners' continued
openness in other sectors and/or the partners' reciprocity
in tolerating protectionism in certain sectors.
It appears that for all the effort to understand the
basis of economic cooperation and cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade, the field of
international politics remains divided if not confused on
the subject.

In addition, when the politics and economics

of Soviet-Western trade issues are added to the analysis
the current theoretical literature on the IPE is
inadequate.

The problem with approaching Soviet-Western

trade from these mainstream IPE theoretical frameworks is
that they are assigned specifically for trade between
nations with established and functioning liberal economies.
However, some conclusions on the current theoretical
perspectives found in the IPE literature are justified.
First, on the basis of the empirical evidence and
theoretical insights, multiple factors are capable of
influencing economic and political cooperation in the
liberalization of international trade.

Friman (1988)

suggests that an integrative approach that takes into
account domestic and systemic variables and that looks at
specific sectors as well as specific nations is necessary
to develop adequate explanations of international trade
policy choices.

Second, security concerns in the long-run

may influence trade appreciably.

It may be that the

relative loss of wealth and power of a hegemon, for
example, will eventually lead to a posture of defensive
positionality on the part of the hegemon, and hence to
significant closure of the IPE.

Yet, the historical record

clearly indicates that hegemons do not take such a turn in
international trade policy lightly.

Both Britain in the

nineteenth century and the U.S. in the twentieth century
have demonstrated that declining hegemons tend to retain
liberal trade policies even after trade has begun to erode
their relative power position.

Third, though it does not

appear to relate so much to security as to domestic
political and economic concerns, there is clearly a
relative gain problem concomitant with international trade.
States seek to intervene in international trade in order to
protect certain industries and sectors from foreign
competition.

Finally, there is also the problem of

"linkage" where liberal governments intervene in trade and
use it as leverage
The coming of

to achieve other goals.
Europe 1992, the rise of the newly

industrialized nations (NICs) of Asia, and the political
and economic initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and the
nations of Eastern

Europe to become more involved

IPE have resulted in a contemporary

world economy

in the
thatis

growing increasingly competitive, and therefore the
incentives for state intervention in the IPE have greatly

increased.

This last point implies that neither hegemonic

stability theory, nor regime theory, nor the theory of
reciprocal cooperation are adeguate, in and of themselves,
to explain the impact of or the motivation for joint
ventures between the Soviet Union and Western firms. An
additional theoretical framework needs to be incorporated
into the IPE literature to explain the integration and
impact of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe states in
the world economy.

The new economics of organization (NEO)

offers transaction-cost economics theory as a solution to
this deficiency in the IPE literature.

This study will

demonstrate that the inclusion of NEO into the existing IPE
literature is theoretically justified and necessary in
order to adequately analyze and explain the factors that
contribute to the establishment of joint ventures between
the Soviet Union and Western firms.

CHAPTER THREE
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION AND
SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Since the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of
Nations in 1776, economic research has focused primarily on
five factors (prices, supply, demand, income, resource
allocation) that affect the functioning and efficiency of
markets and economic systems.

But in any complex economy,

there exist numerous other factors that can have a major
impact on the organization of economic activity. Included
among them are (1) the administrative and internal
organization of production and exchange between firms or
states, (2) the contractual relations between firms or
states, and (3) government control through law, policies,
and regulations (e.g. tariffs, quotas, export controls)
(McCloskey 1985:224-228).

Orthodox neoclassical economics

has failed to examine thoroughly the relationship between
the functioning and efficiency of markets and non-market
activity (e.g., institutional arrangements and contractual
agreements). The reason for this neglect remains unclear
in the current literature on the subject.
In principle, the methodology of neoclassical economics
offers a framework for analyzing institutional form.
Institutional arrangements are decisions made by economic
agents and should be examined as part of an agent's overall
optimization problem.

In practice, however, neoclassical

economics has never formulated the issue of institutional
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efficiency in that context.

Neoclassical economic theory

assumes agents make decisions within a particular
institutional arrangement, and the efficiency consequences
of those decisions are evaluated relative to the Paretian
ideal.

The problem with this approach is its failure to

adequately explain either the evolution of those
arrangements in the first place or the persistence of
ostensible inefficient institutions thereafter, which
implies that the neoclassical model ignores the opportunity
costs found in alternative mechanisms and contractual
arrangements (Williamson 1986:85-98).

In order to explain

these phenomena a theory is needed that is capable of
demonstrating that the losses resulting from the use of one
method of organization (e.g., institutional arrangements,
contractual agreements) are greater than the cost implied
by the available options.

The new economics of

organization (NEO) and transaction-cost analysis addresses
this problem.

This chapter will explain NEO and

transaction-cost analysis and examine their theoretical
connection and importance to international politics and
Soviet-Western political economy.
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TRANSACTION-COST ANALYSIS
Transaction-Cost Analysis:

The Conceptual Framework

Transaction-cost analysis forces the analyst to
recognize that from the economic agent's point of view the
net value of a given transaction reflects not only the
losses due to the potential misallocation of resources, but
also the costs of conducting the transaction itself.

From

this perspective, transaction costs take on a decisive role
in the analysis of institutional efficiency, for in their
absence all gains from trade would be realized by rational
self-interest seeking agents forming cooperative agreements
(Coase 1960).

Therefore, once we have ascribed costs to

such activities as observation, communication, and
negotiation, the possibility of a divergence between
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions emerge as agents
attempt to exploit circumstantial advantages.

Since

transaction costs in effect drive a wedge between actual
and potential outcomes, our attention is naturally directed
toward the character of those costs.
As previously stated, transaction-cost analysis is the
product of the new subfield of economics called the new
economics of organization (NEO), or institutional
economics.

NEO is an interdisciplinary approach to

institutions and that incorporates contributions from law,
organization theory, economics, and other social sciences.
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While the origins of NEO are grounded in the study of the
firm, the central research focus of NEO is "precisely those
of political economy" as defined by Susan Strange in her
book States and Markets. Strange (1988:18-19) states:
IPE concerns the social, political, and economic
arrangements affecting the global systems of
production, exchange, distribution, and the mix of
values reflected therein.
Oliver Williamson explains that transaction-cost
analysis is a product of NEO based upon Herbert Simon’s
assumption "that human agents are subject to bounded
rationality, whence behavior is intendedly rational, but
only limited so, and are given to opportunism"
1985:30).

(Williamson

The basic unit of analysis is the transaction,

which John Commons (1950:21) defined as a "joint action
where performance is executed in accordance with
established rules" (usually a contractual agreement). The
implicit assumption of Commons’ definition is that any
direct or indirect contracting problem can be examined with
transaction-cost analysis (Ouchi 1980; Williamson
1986:187).

A transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint

ventures with the West and their impact on cooperation and
liberalization of Soviet-Western trade, therefore, would be
justified because of the contractual nature of Soviet joint
ventures with the West.
What are the essential characteristics of the basic
unit of analysis, the transaction?

Ronald Coase's "The

Problem of Social Cost" (1960) suggested that transaction
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costs include all information, negotiation, investment,
contracting, maintenance, and enforcing costs
of a joint action.

Beth and Robert Yarbrough (1990) state:

The transaction is not an instantaneous exchange in a
world of perfectly specified property rights and
perfectly enforced contracts; rather it is a
relationship in which performance may be nonsimultaneous and non-performance may leave an
aggrieved party with little recourse. Given these
elements of anarchy, cooperation requires an
institutional structure consistent with selfenforcement or self-help.
Oliver Williamson has condensed the characteristics of
transaction costs into two distinct categories:
and ex-post transaction costs.

ex-ante

Ex-ante transaction costs

are the costs involved in the negotiation, drafting, and
establishment (e.g.,initial capital investment) of a joint
action (e.g., a joint venture or merger) that aligns the
incentives of the actors involved, and allows an internal
system of institutions and norms control of the
relationship (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson
1985:32-34).

Ex-post transaction costs are the costs

involved in the day to day operation, maintenance, and
governance of a joint action.

Ex-ante and ex-post

transaction costs may be incurred as the result of
activities which are directly productive, which implies
that transaction costs are incurred in the course of
organizing and maintaining an economic or political
activity and thus may vary with organizational form (Coase
I960).

Kenneth Arrow (1969) states:
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The distinction between transaction costs and
production costs is that the former can be varied by a
change in the mode or resource allocation,
organization, and operation of organized activity,
while the latter only depend on technology and output,
and would be the same in all systems.
While a clear and concise definition of transaction
costs is essential to an analysis of Soviet joint ventures
with the West, there exist two other crucial components of
transaction-cost analysis that demand our attention:

the

process from which transaction costs emerge, and asset
specificity.
John Commons (1950) stated that in order for
transaction costs to exist and be measured the following
process must transpire:
In point of time sequence, the transaction has three
stages: first, the negotiations, which are closed
when the agreement on intentions is reached; then the
contract or commitment, which imposed the obligation
of performance and payment upon the parties in future
time; finally the administration or performance of the
obligations agreed upon, when completed by both
parties, closes the transaction.
And with respect to the latter, Oliver Williamson (1986:17)
argues that the most critical dimension of transaction-cost
analysis is the condition of asset specificity.

Asset

specificity exists when transaction-specific (or
idiosyncratic) investment is undertaken in a joint action.
Transaction-specific investment occurs when capital assets
(e.g., human resources, natural resources, goods) are
specifically designed for a particular use, and where the
alternative use (opportunity costs) of the assets invested

are low (Williamson 1986:106-107; Yarbrough and Yarbrough
1987a). Specificity is perhaps best thought of in spatial
terms.

The decision to invest in a transaction-specific

asset is comparable to the selection of a more or less
unique product, process, or site from among a set of
alternative characteristics, technologies, or locations.
Williamson (1986:107) further argues that asset specificity
transforms a bilateral relationship into a bilateral
monopoly because, as a result of transaction-specific
investment, the loss of the relationship would result in
significant excess capacity and other economic losses due
to high transaction costs.

Asset specificity implies that

it is usually to the mutual advantage of each contracting
party to maintain a joint action because each party to the
agreement has become a "hostage" to the relationship
(Telser 1980; Williamson 1983; Yarbrough and Yarbrough
1986).

The literature on transaction-cost analysis assumes

that any investment that is not transaction-specific is a
general purpose or non-specialized investment, which has a
discretely higher value in its next best use (opportunity
costs).
Another essential element of asset specificity is that
the transaction-specific investment exchange transpires
once the required resources have been committed on the part
of the investor, or in other words that the investment is
durable.

If expenditures, asset life, and exchange were

instantaneous, appropriate quasi-rents could not exist,
since alternative buyers and sellers would always be
available.

The fact that assets are durable implies that

transaction-specific relationships should persist for an
appreciable period (Williamson 1986:105-109).

It is the

absence of continuous alternatives in the wake of
transaction-specific investments which gives rise to
transactional frictions.

When investments are non

specialized, opportunistic inclinations are attenuated by
the ability of either party to turn to alternative partners
should one seek to gain at the expense of the other
(opportunism). When investments are transaction-specific
in nature, however, agents become able to employ variables
such as output, effort, quality, and information in a
strategic fashion which alters the distribution of the
surplus or rent accruing to those assets in their favor
(Williamson 1986:110).
Transaction-Cost Analysis and Soviet-Western Economic and
Political Cooperation
The failure of neoclassical economics to examine the
relationship between market and non-market activity has
also inhibited the development of viable theories of
international political economy that are capable of
explaining the role of international institutional
arrangements and contractual agreements in governing and
facilitating cooperation in the IPE.

Critics of

neoclassical economics argue that the failure of
neoclassical theories of international trade can be
attributed to the apolitical and ahistorical nature of the
assumptions and methodologies of those theories (Coase
1960; Conybeare 1980; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987b).
Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1987a;4) also argue that
neoclassical economics has ignored the basic assumption of
transaction costs in international trade because
neoclassical theory "posits trade as a situation of near
perfect harmony, zero transaction costs, a positive sum
game with little room for strategy, negotiation, or
disagreements."
The failure of neoclassical economics to develop
international trade theories that explain the way in which
institutional arrangements and contractual agreements
govern and facilitate trade has stimulated research in
other disciplines, primarily international politics, in
search of a truly systemic theory of international trade.
The pioneer efforts of such individuals as Kindleberger,
Keohane, Krasner, and Strange have resulted in viable
alternative theories of international trade found in the
literature on international cooperation and international
regimes.

While these theories offer a "useful analysis of

a specific institution or historical episode" they fail to
develop a "systematic theory to explain the wide range of
international trade institutions, and contractual

agreements, that have existed under differing economic
conditions" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987b).

In addition

the analytical frameworks of these theories of
international cooperation and regimes and are not
completely conducive to an analysis of Soviet-Western
trade.
Transaction-cost analysis' emphasis on institutions,
contracts, economic conditions, rules, enforcement, and
opportunism provides the framework for a truly systematic
theory of international trade and cooperation that can
explain the role of these variables in governing and
facilitating East-West, West-West, and North-South trade.
The relevant world for NEO is a world or institutional
setting in which uncertainty prevails, a world where, for
example, "individuals are only bounded rationally, legal
enforcement of agreements is costly and imperfect, and
opportunistic acts cannot be ruled out" (Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1990:239).

In this environment relatively

complex institutional structures may be required for
mutually beneficial associations and arrangements that
deter opportunism (such as Soviet joint ventures).
The scope of uncertainty in the NEO environment is
further increased by bounded rationality and opportunism
because they may result in incompletely specified and
imperfectly obeyed agreements.

In addition, the scope of

uncertainty can be increased by an actor's lack of
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information about other actor's motivations, perceptions,
preferences, and actions (Hodgson 1988:21-24).

This makes

cooperation difficult, "even when all parties are acting in
good faith, and it therefore creates a demand for norms to
enhance predictability and political and economic
institutions to support exchange and other forms of
cooperation"

(Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:240).

Uncertainty may also increase if actors are engaging in
opportunistic protection behavior, strategic behavior that
is designed to deliberately conceal an actor's preferences
or actions in order to achieve gains that improves its
position while threatening the welfare and utility of other
actors (Hodgson 1988:37-30; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990).
Because of these conditions, the problem in this type of
environment "becomes one of devising institutions that will
facilitate cooperation by safeguarding against opportunism,
maintaining flexibility, forestalling disputes, and
mediating any disputes that do arise" (Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1990:240).

A careful examination of the NEO

environment reveals an environment similar to the IPE in a
world of complex interdependence as described by Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book Power and
Interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1988:253-254) state:
From the foreign policy standpoint, the problem facing
individual governments is how to benefit from
international exchange while maintaining as much
autonomy as possible. From the perspective of the
international system, the problem is how to generate
and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of
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cooperation in the face of competing efforts by
governments, and nongovernmental actors, to manipulate
the system for their own benefit.
A transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint ventures with
the West and their impact on East-West economic and
political relations, therefore, would also be justified
because Soviet joint ventures occur within a NEO like
environment consisting of (1) complex institutional and
contractual agreements, (2) the uncertain nature of Soviet
joint ventures, (3) the unsettled Soviet political and
economic climate, and (4) the anarchic structure of the
international system.
Geoffrey Hodgson, Oliver Williamson, and Beth and
Robert Yarbrough have all contributed to the development of
the analytical framework from a systematic theory of
international trade based on transaction-cost analysis not
found in the current literature of neoclassical economics
and international politics.

Yarbrough and Yarbrough

(1987b:130) provide additional justification for the
application of transaction-cost analysis to the study of
cooperation in the liberalization of international trade:
International trade presents a fertile ground for
transaction-cost analysis for two reasons. First, an
additional level of potential opportunism is
introduced. A British firm entering into trade
involving substantial transaction-specific investment
with a French firm faces two potential levels of
opportunism: the French firms may threaten to halt
trade in order to alter the prices at which trade
occurs and the British states may threaten to halt the
relationship by imposing trade restrictions. This
second level of opportunism enriches the implications
of the transaction-cost framework since organizational
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forms should reflect the additional sources of
transactional insecurity. Second, the enforcement
institution of the state is weak or absent in
international transactions making the lack of
efficacious third-party adjudication and enforcement
even more evident than in transactions within a single
nation-state (e.g., the Soviet Union). As a result,
provision of adequate governance structures for all
international transactions may require an especially
diverse and sophisticated range of institutions.
State and private opportunism in the international
system can take two forms:

(1) reneging or cheating on

negotiated contractual trading agreements, and (2) the
establishment of barriers to trade (e.g., quotas, tariffs,
export controls). To control the level of opportunism in
the international trading system, transaction-cost analysis
posits that the establishment of institutional safeguards
is required between trading partners.

Nonstandard

contractual arrangements consist of such mechanisms as
economic hostages, joint ventures, and licensing
agreements.

Each has relevance to an understanding of

Soviet joint ventures with the West.
Nonstandard Contracting in Soviet-Western Economic and
Political Relations: The Logic of Soviet Joint Ventures
with the West
The Soviet joint venture law of 1987 was the first
authorization of such industrial cooperation between East
and West in the Soviet Union since 1930.

It was in 1930

that Stalin cancelled all joint ventures with foreign
countries on ideological grounds, claiming that such
enterprises were inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism because
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they granted foreign control over vital sectors of the
Soviet economy (Ross 1987).
Why did Gorbachev decide once again to allow Soviet
joint ventures with Western firms within the geographical
borders of the Soviet Union?

By allowing joint ventures

between Soviet enterprises and Western firms Gorbachev and
his economic advisers hoped to gain three major economic
benefits.

First, they hope that joint ventures with the

West can provide the Soviet Union with an additional source
of investment capital.

Second, Soviet officials hope that

exports from joint ventures with will open new
opportunities and markets for trade between the Soviet
Union and the West.

Finally, and perhaps most important,

they hope joint ventures will provide a vehicle for
absorbing advanced foreign technology and foreign
management skills that, in turn, will help transform Soviet
enterprises into economically efficient and internationally
competitive units. (Bergson 1989:163-174; Lindsay 1989:6065).

Thus, the Soviet logic for engaging in the

nonstandard contracting arrangement of joint ventures with
the West is based on the Soviet concept that joint ventures
are the most cost-effective (least amount of hard currency
expenditure) and efficient means of acquiring and applying
Western technology, business techniques, and internal
organization to Soviet enterprises in a NEO-like
environment.
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If, on the other hand, Western firms are to be induced
to invest in the Soviet Union, thereby fulfilling the
Soviet Union's desire to absorb foreign capital and its
attendant benefits, the goals of Western investors must
also be satisfied.

The goals of Western firms to invest in

the Soviet Union, and hence their interests, are
straightforward.

The foremost motivation for Western firms

to invest in the Soviet Union has been to gain access,
immediately or in the future, to what they perceive to be a
huge domestic market, and to preempt competitors from
gaining market share in the Soviet Union.

Foreign

investors are sensitive to their perception of the Soviet
government's willingness to create a favorable environment
for their long-run goals (Lindsay 1989:85).

Western firms

have, therefore, watched closely changes in the investment
environment and have responded to concrete or perceived
changes in it (Vestnik 1990).

Potential investors have

withheld investment when the environment has seemed to be
poor, while extant investors have made their complaints
known.

Conversely, Western investors have entered joint

venture projects when the environment improved.
The emphasis of transaction-cost analysis on
institutions, contracts, economic and political conditions,
rules, enforcement, and opportunism provides the framework
for a truly systematic theory of international trade and
cooperation that can explain the role of these factors in

facilitating or inhibiting not only East-West but WestWest, North-South, East-South, and West-South economic and
political relations.

Employing a systematic framework is

particularly important to the study of Soviet foreign
economic policy and the IPE because Gorbachev has not made
a secret of his interest in a growing role for the Soviet
Union in the IPE, especially in Western organizations and
arrangements such as GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank.

At

the same time, however, Gorbachev wants to guard against a
repetition of past experiences in which economic ties with
the West were allegedly exploited to bring political
pressure on the Soviet Union (e.g., the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment). One way to avoid this problem is to raise the
domestic political costs to Western governments while
reducing economic costs to Western business firms, thus
mixing international politics and international economics.
Presumably the stronger the vested interest of Western
business firms in the Soviet economy, the more difficult it
will be for Western governments to politicize economic
relations and to inhibit full Soviet integration into the
IPE.
Internationally and domestically, economic and
political agents, whether they be individual firms or
sovereign states, must achieve economic and political
cooperation in a world of uncertainty, bounded rationality,
imperfect enforcement mechanisms, and opportunism.

However, the effect of these factors on a cooperative
arrangement depends upon the attributes of the existing
relationship between the agents.

Therefore, as a preface

to a transaction-cost analysis of Soviet joint ventures
with the West, it is essential to understand the
characteristics and the evolution of the primary
transaction costs in Soviet-Western political economy.
SOVIET-WESTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY t

THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
In a free market trade occurs when it is to the mutual
advantage of the participants to engage in exchange.

In

international trade, participants exploit their comparative
advantages in order to profit economically and sometimes
politically.

When compared to North-South or West-West

trade, or when figured in volume and dollars, SovietWestern trade is sometimes considered less important.
Regarded as a matter related to international security and
defense, however, its importance cannot be overlooked.
Weighing recent changes in the government and economic
system of the Soviet Union, continuing developments in the
international control and transfer of technology and goods,
and overtures made to the West by President Mikhail
Gorbachev, conventional attitudes about the economic and
political relations of Soviet-Western trade warrant
reevaluation.

Thus, before undertaking any analysis of

Soviet joint ventures with the West and their political and

economic impact on Soviet-Western relations, it is
necessary to examine first the basic characteristics and
evolution of the primary transaction costs in SovietWestern political economy which provides the basis for an
analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the West.

The

primary transaction costs affecting Soviet-Western
political economy that demand attention are (1) trade
barriers, (2) problems related to monopsony market
conditions, (3) the foreign exchange policy, and (4) risk
and return.

However, these transaction costs are not

mutually exclusive and can produce various other
transaction costs to economic and political agents in the
Soviet-Western political economy.
Trade Barriers
If the benefits of a trading relationship are enjoyed
predominantly by one of the partners, the other has the
potential to use various trade barriers as a source of
influence or leverage in seeking to obtain economic and
noneconomic concessions and other valued outcomes.

The

behavior of target countries can be influenced by imposing
opportunity costs and transaction costs on them.

Trade

barriers commonly take the form of restrictions on exports
(tariffs), limits on imports (quotas), or impediments to
the financial activities of the state (sanctions). Any
actions or conditions that reduce the price received for

exports, or increase the price paid for imports, will tend
to reduce the gains of trade.

In cases of attempted

leverage, the interruption of trade is usually involved to
some degree (Mastanduno 1985:25).

This is especially true

in Soviet-Western trade as both the West and the Soviet
Union have imposed policies that inhibit cooperation in the
liberalization of Soviet-Western trade.
Western Trade Barriers: The desire to insure international
security has led to the imposition of formal controls on
Western commerce with the Soviet Union, the Eastern
European states, and the People's Republic of China.

The

United States and Japan, along with the members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), restrict trade,
investment, and transfers of technology to these countries.
These restrictions are administered primarily through the
operation of an international regime known as the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM). The primary purpose of COCOM is to integrate the
efforts of its members to prevent the movement of strategic
goods and technology to designated countries (Bertsch
1988:11-12).
If trade barriers can be difficult to impose and
maintain when attempted unilaterally, multilateral trade
barriers

are even more difficult to implement.

A trade

barrier may have as its goal a variety of objectives, but
the use of trade barriers tends to reduce the gains from

trade (Mastanduno 1985:26-27).

Because trade is a

reciprocal activity, costs are also felt by the country
that seeks to achieve its goals by imposing trade barriers.
These can include the loss of profitable markets, or the
loss of the advantages of economies of scale of production.
Another loss is the stability that can result from
increased interdependence and the political benefits of
such stability (Bertsch 1988:19-20).

Loss can be further

experienced through the slowing of research and technical
advances (Nau 1988).
Strategic trade barriers have often been a source of
economic and political disagreement among the countries of
the industrialized West.

The conflict derives from

divergent national opinions, perceptions, and objectives
about the correct balance between economic and security
interests, including the degree to which the trade barriers
actually serve the collective economic and security needs
of the West.

This is increasingly problematic in a world

market that is becoming more competitive as nation-states
divide into well organized trading blocs (e.g., the
European Community (EC) and the North American Trade
Agreement between the United States and Canada). The
industrialized West, newly industrialized countries (NICs),
the Third World, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European
states are all currently seeking to expand their share of
the world's wealth, which makes the specific character and
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nature of strategic trade barriers imposed by other
governments critically important for their success or
failure because of the opportunity costs and transaction
costs involved in those barriers (Bertsch 1988:25-26).
This debate over the effectiveness and value of
strategic trade barriers has led to the development of two
fundamentally different points of view in the West
regarding the proper management of Soviet-Western trade.
The first view regards the antagonistic aspects of the
relationship between the Soviet Union, the United States,
and their allies as the primary concern to be addressed in
decisions about Soviet-Western trade.

This viewpoint

assumes that Soviet-Western trade benefits the Soviet Union
disproportionately, and that trade will allow the Soviet
Union the opportunity to redirect its resources away from
consumer industries and toward military research and
production.

As a consequence, the West will be forced to

increase its spending on defense in order to offset an
increased Soviet military threat caused by trade and
technology transfers (Cooper 1985; Mastanduno 1985:90-91;
Wolf 1983:49).

Therefore, the transaction costs of the

Soviet-Western trading relationship are assumed to be too
high to engage in full scale economic activity with the
Soviet Union.

The second viewpoint assumes that the benefits of
Soviet-Western trade accrue to the West.

The ability of

Western firms to open and compete for portions of the
markets in the Soviet Union is seen as potentially
profitable and beneficial in a variety of ways to Western
economies.

It is thought by proponents of this view that

contacts made through Soviet-Western trade can bring about
greater political stability through increased levels of
economic cooperation and interdependence (Malish 1985;
Mastanduno 1985:90).

Therefore, this viewpoint assumes

that the benefits of the Soviet-Western trading
relationship are greater than the transaction costs
involved in that relationship and in the long-run will
reduce the level of transaction costs.
The position taken by the United States has generally
been that the benefits of Soviet-Western trade accrue
almost entirely to the Soviet Union.

The United States has

used its hegemonic position in the world, and in COCOM, to
apply pressure to the Soviet Union through both
multilateral and unilateral actions on a wide variety of
political and economic issues, some of which have been
essentially unrelated to narrowly conceived security
concerns (e.g., MFN status for the Soviet Union) (Nau
1988:77).

The European Community and Japan have often supported
the opposing view.

The economies of Western Europe and

Japan are highly dependent upon trade as a source of
national income, and they have favored more liberal
policies in regard to Soviet-Western trade.

This has

caused the West to experience conflicting pressures
regarding the most efficacious role for strategic trade
barriers (e.g., export controls) and Western oriented
international regimes.

The West has experienced both a

desire to promote liberal attitudes and integration in
international trade in order to enhance economic stability,
and the fear that a failure to constrain the interests of
the Soviet Union through strategic trade barriers would
have important negative consequences for Western security
and economic interests (Bertsch 1988:26).

Soviet joint

ventures with the West have only increased these concerns
because, by design, joint ventures are supposed to be an
effective mechanism for the transfer of high technology and
management know-how from the West to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Trade Barriers:

It is erroneous to assume that the

West has an exclusive monopoly on barriers to trade with
the Soviet Union.

Aslund (1989), Lindsay (1989), and

McIntyre (1987) argue that a major barrier to SovietWestern trade is the structure of the Soviet foreign trade
system since it imposes controls on the export and import
of energy, food, raw materials, and other products
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considered of strategic importance to the Soviet Union.
Historically, the guiding principle of the Soviet
foreign trade system has been autarky or monopoly of
foreign trade which gives the state absolute control over
foreign economic policy (Hewett 1988B:287; Hough 1988:6).
Until 1987, the Soviet foreign trade system operated in a
manner originally created during the 1930s under Stalin.
The foreign trade organizations (FTO) established a
monopoly over foreign trade by buying and selling goods in
foreign currency and then selling to or buying from Soviet
enterprises in domestic currency, which usually resulted in
lower prices for producers of export goods.

Industrial

enterprises had no independent rights to export or import;
the FTOs managed all details of import/export transactions,
thereby keeping the enterprises from engaging in direct
contact with foreign customers and participating in trade
negotiations (Hewett 1988b:114-115).
In January 1987, a law entitled "Measures to Improve
Management of Foreign Economic Relations" was enacted by
the Soviet government in an effort to reduce the
inefficiencies and barriers of international trade with the
West intrinsic in the Soviet foreign trade system.

The

legislation originally granted authority to 21 ministries
and 68 enterprises to trade directly with foreign markets.
Enterprises can now negotiate the export terms for their
products in order to obtain highest possible hard currency

earnings.

Previously, an enterprise's exports and earnings

were based on a system for the delivery of specified goods
to meet the requirements of the plan set forth by GOSPLAN
(Hough 1988:54-67).

This reorganization of the Soviet

foreign trade system was designed to provide greater
incentives for Soviet enterprises to expand their export
trade in order to make profits, which Soviet policymakers
hoped would improve the quality of Soviet exports.
In January 1988, another phase of the reorganization
of the Soviet foreign trade system was implemented.

The

Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) and the State Foreign
Economic Committee were merged into the Ministry for
Foreign Economic Relations (MVES). The MVES was designed
to provide strategic guidance to the foreign trade sector,
but while the MFT and the State Foreign Economic Committee
were abolished the MVES assumed the dominant role of
monitoring the entire foreign trade system of the Soviet
Union.

However, the most recent reorganization of the

Soviet foreign trade system appears to offer a measure of
decentralization designed to eliminate barriers and
facilitate trade with the West.

The new Soviet Cabinet of

Ministers has no Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations,
most FTOs are now being abolished, and individual firms are
being given greater autonomy and responsibility in the area
of foreign trade (CIA 1990:44-46).
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The Monopsony Problem
The basic problems presented by trading relations
between market economies and nonmarket economies are those
that neoclassical economists describe in their discussion
of monopsony market relations.

Specifically, these

economists suggest that market failure occurs when there
exists only one or a few buyers for particular products (a
monopsony).

In this relationship the sellers are seen as

being somewhat at the mercy of the buyer.

While ideal

market conditions (e.g., many buyers and sellers, perfect
information) might suggest a positive-sum growth for all
parties to an exchange, the ability of a monopsony buyer to
attain lower than competitive level prices from competing
sellers has been the economic basis on which Western
nation-states have denied the Soviet Union and its allies
privileges that they currently accord each other (e.g.,
membership in GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF).
Although the existence of Soviet monopsony power has
been disputed by some researchers, a more convincing
argument can be made that even if monopsony power is weak
at the present level of trade, this might not be the case
if trade were to expand significantly.

Critics of the

existence of a monopsony argue that centrally planned
economies, often being price insensitive and relatively
small traders, tend also to be price takers rather than
price fixers (Wolf 1983).

In answering these criticisms it

can be argued that although the end users of a product
imported into a centrally planned economy may be price
insensitive, the appointed trade minister, by establishing
open bidding by Western firms, can easily become price
sensitive with respect to the purchase of foreign goods.
Vernon argues that although the Soviet Union and its allies
may be small traders in the current international trading
system, the challenge "is to devise a set of institutions
and procedures that is compatible with the growing volume
of East-West trade" (Vernon 1983:49).

Vernon believes this

challenge includes having to deal with Soviet economic
power based on their monopsony position.

He argues that

even with high technology items there are often competing
technologies and that:
. . . where such competition exists, the USSR appears
to be in an excellent position to exploit the fact.
First of all, few sellers to the Soviets are
interested in making an isolated sale, however large
that sale may be; most sellers are aware that firms
with a prior record in the Soviet Union have an inside
track for the future (1983:51).
In addition, Vernon suggests that the tendency for a
Western firm to want to achieve an "inside track" will be
extremely strong since sellers will attain this privileged
market position with respect to an entire economy and not
just part of it.

Consequently, the temptation for Western

firms to cut prices during the initial bidding process will
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be "commensurately stronger" in their dealing with the
Soviet Union than it would be in their dealings with other
Western firms (Vernon 1983:51).
In the monopsony condition sellers are likely to
practice price-cutting and become more competitively
aggressive because of the ability of the large purchaser to
drastically affect the seller's returns on investment.

The

negative effects of heightened competition are most
apparent under three conditions, (1) when the seller's
production capacity is subject to large economies of scale,
(2) when surplus capacity already exists in the market, and
(3) when the level of asset specificity in the seller's
production function is high (Lindert 1986:178).

This last

condition occurs when a seller's capital investment is only
profitable when long term sales guarantees have been
achieved.

Higher levels of competition among sellers occur

as these three conditions come into play.
The analysis of the basic monopsonistic relationship
between Western firms attempting to sell and a single (or
few) buyers represented by socialist trade organizations
and enterprises in the Soviet Union is complicated by
Western government attempts to become involved on the part
of individual sellers' interests in gaining lucrative
contracts.

These Western governments have two methods by

which they can aid their national commercial interests with
respect to a monopsonistic market.

First, they can provide

subsidies in the forms of low cost credit or, more
directly, through export subsidies.

Both export subsidies

and low cost credit have been used extensively by Western
European countries to gain a competitive advantage over
other foreign commercial interests in the Soviet-Western
trade market.

Second, market-oriented governments can

develop cooperative relations of their own through an
international regime to counteract the monopsonistic power
of socialist trade ministries (e.g., GATT, COCOM) through
the establishment of trade barriers (Crawford 1988).
Therefore, trade between several Western firms and a single
monopsonist trader in the Soviet Union will tend, by
definition, to heighten the natural level of transaction
costs since the existence of a monopsony implies small
numbers bargaining at the very beginning of a trading
relationship.

Consequently, one would expect Western firms

to encounter high levels of transaction costs as they
attempt to insure they are not exploited and to avoid
Western government controls that can hinder Western
economic activity with the Soviet Union.
While the current reforms in the Soviet Union advocate
the implementation of many aspects of a market economy, the
monopsony problem still exists.

The Wall Street Journal

(September 12, 1990) reported that after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, representatives of the Soviet
petrochemical industry were acting as a monopsonistic power
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by causing intense competition among Western petrochemical
firms negotiating joint ventures in this area.
Producer cooperatives, the right of Soviet enterprises
to engage in foreign trade with external markets, and the
increasing economic autonomy of the fifteen republics add
to the complexity of the monopsony problem.

In a regulated

or planned market system, such as that advocated by
Gorbachev, monopsony power shifts from the center in Moscow
to the various producer cooperatives, enterprises, and
republics.

Until the Soviet Union implements a free market

system many of the elements of a monopsonistic power will
persist in the Soviet Union.

This makes an understanding

of the monopsony problem, even in the age of perestroika,
essential for an analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the
West and their economic and political impact on SovietWestern trade and the IPE.
The Foreign Exchange Problem
A major stumbling block to significant increases in
the volume and value of Soviet-Western trade has been the
nonconvertibility of the ruble on international foreign
exchange markets.

Exchange rates are pivotal in

international trade for two reasons:

(l) they allow

participants in international trade to compare the prices
of goods and services in different countries, and (2) trade
transactions require that the currency of one country be

exchanged for the currency of the other country in order to
pay for the goods and services purchased on international
markets (Krugman and Obtsfeld 1988:307; Yarbrough and
Yarbrough 1988:354).

According to the theory of purchasing

power parity (PPP) , in the long-run a country's foreign
exchange rate on international foreign exchange markets is
determined by the relative prices of goods and services
within that country.

The problem in the Soviet Union is

that relative prices for goods and services do not reflect
relative scarcity, which means setting an appropriate
exchange rate for the ruble on international foreign
exchange markets is problematic at this point (Hewett 1988;
Zverev 1989).
Although the major industrialized countries,
especially those in the West, have had free floating
foreign exchange rates since 1973, the Soviet Union's
official commercial exchange rate for the ruble remains
fixed at $1.66.

On the other hand, PLANECON (1989)

estimates that the exchange rate for the ruble on the
Soviet black market and in many international trade
transactions to be approximately $.60.

In December 1988,

the Council of Ministers issued an edict entitled "On the
Further Development of the External Economic Activity of
State, Cooperative, and Other Public Enterprises,
Associations, and Organizations."

In it the Soviet Council

of Ministers directed the Ministry of Finance to expand the
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foreign trade activities of Soviet firms, simplify trade
regulations, and develop a plan for convertibility of the
ruble.

Soviet officials now believe that a convertible

ruble is essential to encourage Western investment, expand
Soviet-Western trade and technology transfers, and impose a
market responsiveness on Soviet firms.
While the Soviets work to make the ruble a convertible
currency they have attempted to developed temporary
solutions to the foreign exchange problem in order to allow
repatriation of profits by Western firms.

First, a foreign

exchange market is being created by the Soviet government
in Moscow to allow Soviet and Western businesses to buy and
sell foreign currency.

The prices on this exchange market

will reflect currency prices found on other international
foreign exchange markets, but the Soviet market is limited
to Soviet firms engaged in international trade or joint
ventures.

The Soviet government still plans to retain

fixed exchange rates until 1993 for the domestic market
under the "Gorbachev Plan" (New York Times. October 17,
1990).

Second, the Soviets have created special exchange

rates for approximately 2000 products by setting the
exchange rates for equipment ($.50 - $1.00 per ruble) and
raw materials ($2.00 and up per ruble).

This aspect of the

solution is designed to make a dollars worth of machinery
sales worth more rubles than a dollars worth of raw
materials so as to offset the inconsistencies of the
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unreformed price system caused by massive government
subsidies (Hewett 1988a). Third, the foreign exchange
problem in joint ventures (e.g., repatriation of profits)
is being overcome through old-fashioned bartering.

For

example, Pepsico receives Russian vodka as its share of the
profits in its joint venture arrangement, which it then
sells on the world market for hard currency (Hardt 1989a).
Making the ruble a convertible currency on
international foreign exchange markets would remove a major
obstacle to Soviet integration into the IPE.

The success

of Soviet joint ventures and the future development of
Soviet-Western trade requires that the Soviet Union make
the ruble convertible in order to have a direct business
connection with Western markets.

However, ruble conversion

may cause some unwanted transaction-costs for the Soviet
Union.

According to PPP, it is highly probable that a

convertible ruble on international exchange markets would
cause domestic price increases in the Soviet Union, which
would increase the demand by Soviet consumers for imports
and thereby dramatically reduce the value of the ruble.
Thus, ruble conversion is a zero-sum game for Gorbachev
because a convertible ruble would enhance the Soviet
prospects in IPE but could hurt the governments image
within the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, maintaining a

non-convertible ruble could potentially have the opposite
effect.
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Risk and Return
Formal risk analysis begins by categorizing the
various types of risks into a four-tier hierarchy.

At the

top of the hierarchy is country risk, which may be divided
into two subcategories, (1) sovereign (or transfer) risk,
which relates to government loans, and (2) country risk,
which is a broader concept that encompasses the economic
and political factors that affect the creditworthiness and
opportunities of a nation-state (Goldstein and Vanous 1983;
Merrill 1982).

Macroeconomic risk is found on the second

tier of the hierarchy.

Macroeconomic risk "relates to

specific macroeconomic factors including devaluations,
recessions, and economic policy shifts that may impact the
business within a nation" (Korbrin, Basek, Blank, La
Palombara 1980).

Industry risk and project risk, which

deal with a specific product or investment opportunities,
occupy tiers three and four of the hierarchy.
Uncontrollable risk factors are the most serious
concern of Western firms involved in Soviet joint ventures.
Korbrin, Basek, Blank, and La Palombara (1980) define
uncontrollable risk factors as "those that are not amenable
to alleviation by a firm's own strategic choices, although
the firm's policies may guard against or limit damage from
some forms of risk."

Merrill (1982) further argues that

most of the uncontrollable risks found in international
business relate to country risk and macroeconomic risk

factors.

In theory, country risk and macroeconomic risk

are the most difficult to analyze because they usually
involve more than two actors.

For example, in a Soviet

joint venture arrangement, country and macroeconomic risk
analysis would involve the partners to the joint venture,
the Soviet government, the Western firm's home government,
and the other actors that make-up the IPE.
Goldstein and Vanous (1983) identify three factors
that are essential to any Western firm's analysis of the
risks of a business venture in the Soviet Union:

(1)

Soviet trade strategy, (2) Soviet internal investment
priorities and infrastructure development, and (3) Soviet
macroeconomic policy.

The current situation in the Soviet

Union requires an additional factor to be added to any
Western firm's risk analysis:
stability.

Soviet political and social

It is reasonable to assume that a Western firm

would not want to invest heavily in a country where the
potential exists for civil unrest or war even though that
country offers the possibility of a lucrative market.

The

reason these factors are considered a requirement in
Western firms' risk analysis of the Soviet Union is because
they indicate the specific opportunities, strategies, and
transaction costs to which Western firms should be
cognizant.

Bergson (1989), Hewett (1988b), and Lindsay (1989)
assert that Soviet trade strategy is a vital component of
Gorbachev's transition to a controlled market economy, thus
making assessment of Soviet trade an important factor in
estimating long-run Soviet economic prospects.

The key

element for Western firms analyzing Soviet trade strategy
is calculating whether the Soviet Union is moving from an
import-substitution development strategy to an export
promotion development strategy.

Yarbrough and Yarbrough

(1988:302) state that the major indicators of a transition
from import substitution to export promotion are growth of
export value and volume, increased industrial
competitiveness, and reductions in the degree of effective
protection.

Tedstrom (1990) argues that while export

indicators are moving marginally upward, increased
industrial competition and reduced protectionism have not
fully materialized in the Soviet Union.
Soviet internal investment priorities and
infrastructure development is the second key factor of
Western firms' risk analysis of the Soviet Union.
Goldstein and Vanous (1983) identify several warning signs
in assessing this risk factor:

(1) a preference for large,

prestigious projects over basic infrastructure, (2) lean
distribution of investment resources across various
projects, (3) reliance on imported capital for major
projects, and (4) subsidized inputs.

In June 1989, former
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Prime Minister Ryzhkov reported that the Soviet Union was
severely undercapitalized and that the problem was
exacerbated by a poor track record for job completion and
the tendency to overextend resources across projects (FBISSOV, June 8, 1989).

Solutions to the problem of

undercapitalization are needed in order for the Soviet
Union to increase its productivity, thus making its economy
more competitive in the IPE and more attractive to foreign
investors due to lower transaction costs (e.g., capital
investment on the part of the Western firm).
Michael Porter (1990) and Beth and Robert Yarbrough
(1988) argue that one of the most important elements of
maintaining an attractive international business
environment is the implementation of solid and competent
macroeconomic policy (particularly fiscal policy) by a
nation-state.

Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1988:433) state:

A nation that is vulnerable to poor fiscal management
may be a poorer risk from the foreign partner's
viewpoint for several reasons. First, it increases
the chances of recession or lengthy economic
stagnation. Second, inflation risks are higher and
inflation may be more severe. This, in turn, upsets
cost forecasts and if exchange rates are fixed, could
impair export profitability.
Lindsay (1989:107) suggests that the Soviet Union has been
very susceptible to poor macroeconomic management because
of the inherent nature of the central planning system and
the massive subsidies the government provides to industry
and agriculture.

V.K. Senchagov, Chairman of GOSTSEN
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(State Committee for Prices), estimated Soviet subsidies to
be approximately 130 billion rubles annually (FBIS-SOV,
August 23,1989).
CONCLUSION: THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF SOVIET-WESTERN
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Despite pronouncements of the end of the Cold War and
the emergence of a "new world order," transaction costs are
ever present in Soviet-Western political economy due to the
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and legal complications
for Western firms doing business in the Soviet Union.
Western and Soviet trade barriers, primarily in the form of
export controls, force a prospective Western partner in a
Soviet joint venture into a marginal acceptability of risk.
The risk involves the possibility that the Western
partner's export or import licenses may not be renewed by
its home government or the Soviet government.

This

compromises a Western firm's investment in a Soviet joint
venture, resulting in lost revenue and surplus capacity for
the joint venture's final product.
The foreign exchange problem illustrates the financial
and economic transaction costs a Western firm may encounter
in a Soviet joint venture.

Financial and economic

transaction costs are primarily the result of the pricing
system of the Soviet command economy.

A government

regulated price system prevents the functioning of a market
based on supply and demand.

This results in problems of
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(1) cost calculations, (2) valuation of investment by
Western partners, (3) foreign currency controls, (4)
repatriation of profits, and (5) payment guarantees to
Western firms (Hardt 1989b:49).

In addition, taut planning

by GOSPLAN produces chronic shortages of raw materials,
machines, energy, and other primary inputs, forcing Western
firms to import these inputs for production thereby
increasing the level of capital investment on the part of
the Western firms.
The monopsonistic power of the various government and
business entities in the Soviet Union increases the risk
and legal transaction costs of Western firms doing business
in the Soviet Union.

John Hardt (1989b:49) explains:

Relatively new and fluid Soviet joint venture
legislation increases business risk. Of particular
interest to business are questions of balancing
accounts, foreign currency valuation, and insurance.
In addition, basic concerns such as domestic handling
of compensation and a mechanism for arbitration must
still be negotiated. The absence of protection in a
wide-range of areas hampers trade by
disproportionately increasing the initial costs and
risks involved. These risks among other, include the
absence of (1) an investment protection treaty, (2)
product promotion contract, and (3) protection for
business and production secrets, patents, trademarks,
and copyrights.
The current political, social, and economic
instability in the Soviet Union also increases the legal
transaction costs of Western firms doing business in the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet system under Gorbachev appears to

be in a very tenuous position with the pressure for
economic and political autonomy by the Soviet republics

increasing and the tide of social unrest stimulated
primarily by the failure of the Soviet economy to meet the
needs of the Soviet people rising.

A change in the Soviet

government may produce a change in Soviet laws concerning
foreign investment that could be to the benefit or
detriment of Western firms currently doing business in the
Soviet Union depending upon who assumed power.
Despite the nature of Soviet-Western political
economy, Western firms have traditionally regarded the
Soviet Union as at least an average but somewhat
problematic risk.

But considering the current Soviet

political and economic crisis and the evolving changes and
instabilities, questions emerge regarding what factors are
considered by a Western firm when it decides to engage or
not engage in a Soviet joint venture project.
Soviet political climate?

Is it Soviet government policy?

Is it Western government policy?
business environment?

Is it the

Is it the international

Is it the overall reduction of the

transaction costs that have traditionally been involved in
Soviet-Western political economy?

This study will now

focus on answering these questions in light of the
continuing changes within the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 4
A TRANSACTION-COST ANALYSIS OF SOVIET JOINT
VENTURES WITH THE WEST

Soviet joint ventures with the West are considered
the cornerstone of Gorbachev's foreign economic policy as
he attempts to reorganize the Soviet foreign trade system
and to fully integrate the Soviet Union into the IPE.
That fact underscored the need to understand the factors
that contribute to the establishment of Western joint
ventures in the Soviet Union.

This chapter develops a

model of Soviet joint ventures with the West that permits
an empirical test of whether transaction costs directly or
indirectly affect Western business firms' decisions to
engage or not engage in a joint venture project.

The

analysis will make it possible to determine (1) if the
decision by Western firms to engage in Soviet joint
ventures is the direct or indirect result of the reduction
of the transaction costs involved in Soviet-Western
political and economic relations brought about by the
implementation of the Soviet joint venture law, and (2) if
the reduction is sufficient to encourage joint ventures to
become a mechanism of greater cooperation in Soviet-Western
political economy.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Survey Data

The data analyzed are responses by Western firms
involved and not involved in Soviet joint ventures to the
surveys found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
Appendix 1, "Questionnaire:

The survey in

Firms Involved in Joint

Ventures with the Soviet Union," was sent to 1,274 Western
firms officially registered with the Soviet Union's
Ministry of Finance as of April 1, 1990.
Appendix 2, "Questionnaire:

The survey in

Firms Not Involved in Soviet

Joint Ventures But Doing Business with the Soviet Union,"
was sent to 350 Western firms that are not engaged in
Soviet joint ventures but are currently engaged in other
business and economic arrangements in the Soviet Union
(e.g., co-production, licensing agreements).

The Western

firms in the control group were identified by Fortune.
Interflo. and Vestnik.
Replies were received from 431 of the 1,274 Western
firms involved in joint ventures, a 34 percent rate of
return.

Three hundred forty-six (346) (80 percent of those

firms that responded) answered the questionnaire while 85
(20 percent of those firms that responded) stated that
company policy prohibited responses to inquires of this
nature.

Correspondingly, 227 replies were received from

the 350 Western firms not involved in joint ventures, a 65

percent rate of return.

Of those Western firms not

involved in Soviet joint ventures but doing business in the
Soviet Union, 172 (76 percent of those firms that
responded) answered the questionnaire while 55 (24 percent
of those firms that responded) stated that company policy
prohibited responses to inquiries of this nature.

The

higher overall rate of return for firms not involved in
joint ventures may best be explained by the fact that all
the firms in this group were located in the United States
and Canada.

On the other hand, firms involved in joint

ventures were located in the United States, Canada,
Germany, Great Britain, Australia, Japan, France, Finland,
Ireland, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium,
and Lichtenstein (see Table 1).

The data in Table 1

indicate that the majority of the firms involved in joint
ventures (approximately 57 percent) were located in the
United States and Canada.

Therefore, the two groups are

made up predominantly of Western firms from these two North
American countries.

This probably means that the business

practices and attitudes of both groups, while not
identical, should be similar in nature.
Another similarity between the two groups is the
location of their Soviet business activity.

Two hundred-

eighty five, or 82 percent, of Western firms involved in
Soviet joint ventures conduct business in the Russian
Republic, and 136, or 80 percent of the Western firms not
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TABLE is

NO SJV AND SJV BY HOME COUNTRY

HOME COUNTRY

No SJV

SJV

United States

131

115

41

81

Canada
Great Britain

-

41

Japan

-

39

Germany

-

29

France

-

13

Italy

-

9

Australia

-

7

Sweden

-

3

The Netherlands

-

3

Spain

-

2

Belgium

-

2

Ireland

-

1

Lichtenstein
TOTAL

1
172

346
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involved in joint ventures.

In addition, 12 percent (42

Western firms) of the firms involved in joint ventures
conduct business in the Baltic republics, while 11 percent
(19 Western firms) of the firms not involved in joint
ventures conduct business in the Baltic republics (see
Table 2).

Since the Russian Republic and the Baltic

republics account for the vast majority of the Soviet gross
national product (GNP) these findings are not surprising.
In general, it appears that Western firms are conducting
business in the most economically important and productive
republics of the Soviet Union.
Survey respondents were queried regarding the area of
industry in which they primarily conducted business in the
Soviet Union.

The summary in Table 3 shows that 46 percent

of the Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures are
involved in the service industry (hotels, tourism, etc.)
and the production of consumers products (e.g., personal
hygiene items). Fifthteen percent of the Soviet joint
ventures are in the medical field, particularly in the area
of medical supplies.

On the other hand, the industry

breakdown for Western firms not involved in joint ventures
is quite different.

Seventy-five percent of the firms not

involved in joint ventures conduct business primarily
within three areas of industry in the Soviet Union:

(1)

chemical, (2) energy (oil, gas, etc.), and (3)
machinery/heavy machinery industry.

Sarah Carey (1991)
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TABLE 2:

LOCATION OF WESTERN FIRMS IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY NO SJV AND SJV

NO SJV

SJV

136

285

Estonia

9

17

Lithuania

7

12

Latvia

3

13

Ukraine

7

11

Georgia

6

7

Belorussia

3

1

Armenia

1

0

Uzbekistan

0

0

Azerbaijan

0

0

Molvavia

0

0

Kazakhistan

0

0

Kirghizia

0

0

Turkmenistan

0

0

Tadzhikistan

0

0

172

346

REPUBLIC
Russia

TOTAL

explains that before June 1990 Western firms in the
chemical, energy, and machinery industries were very
hesitant to engage in a legal entity (joint venture) in the
Soviet Union because of the ambiguity of the joint venture
law itself, particularly questions regarding ownership,
management, and access to resources.

Table 3 also presents

an industry breakdown for those firms in each group that
did not respond to the survey.

This information increases

the reliability of the study by showing that the firms
responding to the survey are a representative sample when
compared to those firms that did not respond.

Carey (1991)

further notes that joint ventures in the Soviet Union in
these areas are increasing because of the Presidential
Decree issued in October 1990 authorizing 100 percent
foreign ownership of joint ventures and other business
forms.

This decree is suppose to grant greater managerial

control and access to resources for Western firms
conducting business in the Soviet Union.
Some significant differences appear to exist between
Western firms involved in joint ventures and those firms
not involved in joint ventures with respect to the market
destination of their final products.

As can be seen in

in Table 4, 28 percent of the firms involved in joint
ventures state that the Soviet domestic market is their
product's final destination, while 56 percent of the firms
not involved in joint ventures target the Soviet domestic
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TABLE 3:

AREA OF INDUSTRY OF WESTERN FIRMS IN THE USSR
R
NO SJV

NR
NO SJV

R
SJV

Chemical

22%

20%

5%

4%

Energy

18%

17%

8%

5%

Computers/Electronics

8%

7%

8%

11%

Food

0%

4%

3%

5%

Service (hotels, tourism,
etc.)

0%

5%

24%

34%

Machinery/Heavy Industry

35%

23%

9%

8%

4%

2%

22%

11%

11%

14%

4%

13%

Medical

2%

6%

15%

5%

Telecommunications

0%

2%

8%

4%

AREA OF INDUSTRY

Consumer Products
Agriculture

TOTAL

NR
SJV

100%
100%
100%
100%
n=172
n=178
n=346 n=928
NR=Did Not Respond to Survey
R=Did Respond to Survey

TABLE 4:

Market Destination

FINAL MARKET DESTINATION
BY NO SJV AND SJV

NOT SJV________ SJV

Soviet Domestic

56%

28%

Home Domestic

15%

12%

World_______________________ 29%__________60%
TOTAL

100%
n=172

100%
n=346

market.

On the other hand, Western firms involved in

Soviet joint ventures appear to be targeting the world
market as the final destination of their products (61
percent compared to 29 percent for Western firms not
involved in Soviet joint ventures). The reason for this
difference in the two groups may be easily explained.
Since 25 percent of the joint venture firms are found in
the service industry (e.g., hotels, tourism, etc.), it is
probable that they view Western business people and
tourists as their primary market.

While this area of

industry brings hard currency to the Soviet economy it
should not be given the same weight as oil, chemicals, and
heavy machinery as similar exports that are included in the
Soviet Union's balance-of-payments.

Removing the service

industry reduces the percentage from 61 to 37 for targeting
the world market by Western firms involved in Soviet joint
ventures.
One factor common to the two groups of firms concerns
the Soviet political climate.

Both were asked what would

have to occur for them to end all business relations in the
Soviet Union (Questions 35 and 34 in Appendix 1 and 2
respectively). Table 5 shows that 80 percent of both firms
involved and not involved in joint ventures would seriously
reconsider their business activity in the Soviet
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Union if civil war should erupt.

Western firms fear losing

their investment and any potential revenues because civil
war would cause economic and political chaos.
The other questions addressed in the survey (not used
in the analysis in the next section) show little variation
between firms involved and not involved in joint ventures.
This is further demonstrated by miscellaneous comments
received from survey respondents in both groups.

For

example, the biggest surprise of doing business in the
Soviet Union cited by survey respondents in both groups was
the cooperation and willingness to work exhibited by their
Soviet co-workers.

In addition, a majority of the survey

respondents from both groups stated that the one thing they
would do if they had the opportunity to renegotiate with
the Soviet Union would be to seek either more control or
complete ownership of the operation.

Further analysis of

the data will demonstrate that Western firms are willing to
conduct business in the Soviet Union, even under diverse
circumstances as the unstable Soviet political climate.
The success of Western firms doing business in the Soviet
Union can only contribute to cooperation in the
liberalization of Soviet-Western political economy and the
complete integration of the Soviet Union in the IPE.
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TABLE 5:

EVENTS IN THE USSR THAT WOULD CAUSE WESTERN
FIRMS TO RECONSIDER DOING BUSINESS IN
THE SOVIET UNION

Event_________________NOT SJV____________ SJV
Secession of the
Republics
The ouster of
President Gorbachev

4%

5%

16%

15%

Civil War in
the Soviet Union________ 80%______________ 80%
TOTAL

100 %

n=172

100 %

n=346
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Model and Methodology
The transaction cost analysis of Soviet-Western joint
ventures with the West employed in this study is based on
the information collected from the surveys found in
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

As previously noted, specific

questions from the surveys were identified, treated as
Likert scale items, and coded into a data set in order to
test the following model and research hypothesis (see Table
6 for precise coding of the data):
Model:

SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2 (INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4 (WESTPOL) + b5 (SOP) + e

SJV:

The Western firm's decision to engage or not
engage in a joint venture in the Soviet
Union.

TAC:

The Western firm's perception of the level
of transaction costs that may be incurred
by engaging in a Soviet joint venture.

INTBUS:

The Western firm's perception of the level
of business and strategic planning risks
involved in engaging or not engaging in
a Soviet joint venture.

SOVPOL:

The Western firm's perception of the Soviet
political climate.

SOP:

The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Soviet government policy on their
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet
joint venture.

WESTPOL:

The Western firm's perception of the impact
of Western government policy on their
decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet
joint venture.

Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
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TABLE 6:

SOVIET JOINT VENTURE MODEL VARIABLES

ACRONYM

SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME________

SJV

Question 3, Appendix 1 and 2
Has firm entered into a joint venture?
The question was coded in the following
manner:
0 = No

TAC

1 = Yes

TAC is a composite variable created from
the following survey questions:
Question 13, Appendix 1
Question 8, Appendix 2
Importance of following factors in Western
firm's decision to engage or not engage
in a Soviet joint venture.
TAC1:
TAC2:
TAC3:
TAC4:

Capital Investment
Soviet Legal Barriers
Governance and Maintenance
Information

These factors were coded in the
following manner:
1 = Very Important
2 = Somewhat Important
3 = Not Important
TAC5: Question 24, Appendix 1
Question 19, Appendix 2
Type of technology required for joint venture
or business activity. TAC5 was coded in the
following manner:
1 = Transaction-Specific Technology
2 = General Purpose Technology
TAC6: Question 24, Appendix 1
Question 22, Appendix 2
The effect of firm's joint venture or business
contractual agreement on the costs of

information.
manner:

TAC6 was coded in the following

98

TABLE 6
ACRONYM

SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME

1 = Very ambiguous and substantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of
information.
2 = Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of
information.
2 = Uncertain
2 = Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
3 = Greatly limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
TAC7: Question 29, Appendix 1
Question 24, Appendix 2
The effect of mechanisms in joint venture and
business activity arrangements on the potential
for opportunism and defection. TAC7 was coded
in the following manner:
1 = Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
2 = Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
2 = Uncertain.
2 = Somewhat reduces the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
3 = Greatly reduces the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
TAC = TAC1 + TAC2+ TAC3 + TAC4 + TAC5 +
TAC6 + TAC7
The composite TAC score was grouped into three
categories (High = 0 to 7), (Average = 8 to 13) ,
and (Low = 14 to 20).
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TABLE 6
ACRONYM

SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME

INTBUS

INTBUS is a composite variable created from
the following questions:
INTBUS1: Question 15, Appendix 1
Question 10, Appendix 2
How much marketing effort is required to sell
products in the Soviet Union? INTBUS1 was
recoded in the following manner:
1 = Much more than average customer.
2 = Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.
2 = Not sure.
3 = Level of required marketing is about
the same.
3 = Less expensive than for most foreign
customers.
INTBUS2: Question 16, Appendix 1
Question 11, Appendix 2
How reliable are the Soviets in complying
with contract agreements? INTBUS2 was
recoded in the following manner:
1 = Never meets agreements.
2 = Sometimes does not meet agreements.
2 = Uncertain.
3 = Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.
3 = Very reliable.
INTBUS3: Question 20, Appendix 1
Question 15, Appendix 2
What is the estimated initial capital investment
for your firm's joint venture or business
activity in the Soviet Union? INTBUS3 was
recoded in the following manner:

TABLE 6

ACRONYM

SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME
1 = Over $30 million
1 = $20 - 29 million
2 = $10 - 19 million
2 = $1 - 9 million
2 = $500,000 - 1 million
3 = $100,000 - 500,000
3 = Under $100,000
INTBUS = INTBUS1 + INTBUS2 + INTBUS3
The composite INTBUS was grouped into three
categories (High = 0 to 3), (Average = 4 to
6) , and (Low = 7 to 9).

SOVPOL

Question 34, Appendix 1
Question 32, Appendix 2
How would your firm describe the current
political climate in the Soviet Union?
The question was coded in the following
manner:
1 = Very stable.
2 = Somewhat stable.
3 = Somewhat unstable.
4 = Very Unstable.

TABLE 6
ACRONYM

SURVEY QUESTION AND CODING SCHEME

SOP

Question 33, Appendix 1 and 2
How would your firm describe the
Soviet government policy on your
decision to engage or not engage
joint venture? The question was
in the following manner.

impact of
firm's
in a
coded

1 = Greatly limits.
2 = Somewhat limits.
3 = Somewhat promotes.
4 = Greatly promotes.
WESTPOL

Question 26, Appendix 1
Question 21, Appendix 2
How would your firm describe the impact of
Western government policy on your firm's
decision to engage or not engage in a
Soviet joint venture? The question was
coded in the following manner:
1 = Greatly limits.
2 = Somewhat limits.
3 = Somewhat promotes.
4 = Greatly promotes.
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In order to test both the relative contribution of the
variables described above and their predictive power in a
multivariate context, logistic regression will be employed
with the decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture (SJV) as the dependent variable and TAC, INTBUS,
SOVPOL, SOP, and WESTPOL as the independent variables.
Conceptualization of Model Variables
Dependent Variable; The dependent variable for the Soviet
joint venture model is the Western firm's decision to
engage or not engage in a joint venture project in the
Soviet Union (SJV). The model suggests that the decision
by a Western firm on participation in a Soviet joint
venture is influenced by the variables TAC, INTBUS,
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL.

The variable SJV is based upon

responses by Western firms to the following question:

"Has

your firm entered into a joint venture agreement with a
firm in the Soviet Union?" (Question 3 on both surveys see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2).
Independent Variables: The first independent variable in
the Soviet joint venture model is TAC.

TAC is a composite

variable based upon the Western firm's perception of the
level of transaction costs that may be incurred if the
Western firm decides to engage in a Soviet joint venture.
TAC is measured on an ordinal scale (l=high, 2=average,
3=low) based on responses to survey questions by both

103

Western firms engaged in Soviet joint ventures and those
Western firms not engage in Soviet joint venture (Questions
13, 24, 27, and 29 in Appendix 1 for Western firms engaged
in Soviet joint ventures, and Questions 8, 19, 22, and 24
in Appendix 2 for Western firms not engaged in Soviet joint
ventures). Table 7 shows the frequency distribution for
TAC.

While not identical, the index for both groups are

similar in that they attempt to measure such things as the
level of capital investment, available information, legal
and contractual barriers, governance and maintenance of the
business relationship, and asset specificity.
In keeping with the theoretical assumptions of NEO and
transaction-cost analysis presented in Chapter 3, TAC was
composed based upon the researcher's classification of
survey responses to the aforementioned questions according
to TAC's coding scheme (l=high, 2=average, 3=low).
Responses for both Western firms involved in Soviet joint
ventures and Western firms not involved in Soviet joint
ventures were classified in the same manner.

For Question

13 in Appendix 1 and Question 8 in Appendix 2, capital
investment, information, Soviet legal barriers, and
governance and maintenance of the Soviet business
relationship were used to compose TAC.

If the survey

respondents stated that either of these transaction cost
factors were "very important" to their business
relationship in the Soviet Union TAC was coded 1 (high), if
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"somewhat important" TAC was coded 2 (average), and if "not
important" TAC was coded 1 (low).
Question 24 in Appendix 1 and Question 19 in Appendix
2 measured the level of asset specificity by asking survey
respondents if their business activity in the Soviet Union
required general purpose (standardized) technology or
transaction-specific technology.

If a respondent answered

general purpose technology TAC was coded 3 (low), and if a
respondent answered transaction-specific technology TAC was
coded 1 (high). This is in keeping with Oliver
Williamson's (1986:17) argument that transaction-specific
technology or asset specificity results in a high level of
transaction costs because the technology is idiosyncratic
to a particular business relationship, the loss of this
relationship would therefore result in significant excess
capacity and other associated losses.
The level of transaction costs incurred from the
available information to Western firms in their business
relationship in the Soviet Union was measured based upon
survey responses to Question 27 in Appendix 1 and Question
22 in Appendix 2.

If respondents stated that their

business relationship "greatly limits and reduces . . . the
strategic use and costs of information" TAC was coded 3
(low). A "somewhat" or "uncertain" response resulted in
TAC being coded 2 (average). TAC was coded 1 (high) if
respondents stated that their business relationship in the
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Soviet Union could result in the strategic use of
information or lead to opportunism by one of the partners
to the contractual agreement.
The last element of TAC is based upon survey responses
to Question 29 in Appendix 1 and Question 24 in Appendix 2.
These questions measure the Western firms' perceived level
of transaction costs involved in the maintenance and
governance of the Western firm's business relationship in
the Soviet Union and if that relationship provides a
mechanism for opportunism.

If respondents stated that

their business form "greatly reduces the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection," TAC was coded 3
(low). A "somewhat reduces" or "uncertain" response to the
survey questions resulted in TAC being coded 2 (average).
TAC was coded 1 (high) if survey respondents stated that
the governance and maintenance of their business form in
the Soviet Union "somewhat" or "greatly" increased the
potential for opportunism and defection."
Based upon the theoretical arguments presented in
Chapter 3, a strong relationship should exist between TAC
and SJV.

If the Western firm's perceived level of TAC is

high then it is expected that the Western firm will be less
likely to decide to engage in a Soviet joint venture.

On

the other hand, it is expected that if the Western firm's
perceived level of TAC is average or low, the Western firm
will be more likely to decide to engage in a Soviet joint
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venture.

Table 8 shows that there exists a strong

relationship in the expected direction between SJV and TAC,
TAC is average (2) or low (3) for 67 percent of those
Western firms involved in Soviet joint ventures.
Conversely, only 28 percent of those firms not involved in
Soviet joint ventures perceived TAC as being low, while
approximately 33 percent of the control group perceived TAC
as being high.
The second independent variable in the Soviet joint
venture model is INTBUS.

INTBUS is the Western firm's

perception of the level of the business and strategic
planning risks involved in the decision to engage or not
engage in a Soviet joint venture.

INTBUS includes such

factors as marketing, Soviet contract reliability, and
capital investment requirements.

INTBUS is measured on an

ordinal scale (l=high, 2=average, 3=low) based on responses
to the survey questions by both Western firms engaged in
Soviet joint ventures (Questions 15, 16, and 20 in Appendix
1) and Western firms not engaged in Soviet joint ventures
(Questions 10, 11, and 15 in Appendix 2).
the frequency distribution for INTBUS.

Table 9 shows
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TABLE 7:

FREQUENCY TABLE FOR TAC
CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY

CUMULATIVE
PERCENT

FREOUENCY

PERCENT

1-High

170

32.8

170

32.8

2-Aver

165

31.9

335

64.9

3-Low

183

35.3

518

100.0

TAC

TABLE 8:

SOVIET JOINT VENTURES BY TRANSACTION COSTS
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF TRANSACTION COSTS
AVERAGE

LOW

SJV

HIGH

0 (NO)

56
(10.8%)

68
(13.1)

48
(9.3%)

172
(33.2%)

1 (YES)

114
(22.0%)

97
(18.7%)

135
(26.1%)

346
(66.8%)

TOTAL

170
(32.8%)

165
(31.8%)

183
(35.4%)

518
(100%)

X2

= 8.79

prob. = .012

TOTAL

gamma = .107
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TABLE 9:

FREQUENCY TABLE FOR INTBUS

CUMULATIVE
CUMULATIVE
INTBUS____ FREOUENCY____ PERCENT____ FREOUENCY____ PERCENT
1-High

143

28.8

149

28.8

2-Aver

188

36.3

331

61.6

3-Low

187

36.1

518

100.0

INTBUS is based on survey responses to the
aforementioned questions using the coding scheme l=high,
2=average, 3=low.

Question 15 in Appendix 1 and Question

10 in Appendix 2 measured the marketing level required by
Western firms to sell products or services in the Soviet
Union.

If the survey firms stated that their marketing

effort required "much more than average foreign customer"
INTBUS was coded 1 (high). A response of "initial sales
require more marketing effort, but repeat sales do not" or
"not sure" resulted in INTBUS being coded 2 (average).
INTBUS was coded 3 (low) if survey firms stated the level
of required marketing was the same or "less expensive than
for most foreign customers."

The same criteria was applied

to Question 16 in Appendix 1 and Question 11 in Appendix 2.
INTBUS was coded 1 (high) if firms checked number 5 on
Questions 16 and 11, coded 2 (average) if they selected
response items 3 or 4, and coded 3 (low) if they selected
response items 1 or 2.
Question 20 in Appendix 1 and Question 15 in Appendix
2 measured the estimated level of capital investment
initially invested by Western firms involved in Soviet
joint ventures and Western firms not involved in Soviet
joint ventures.

INTBUS was coded 1 (high) if firms

selected response items 1 or 2, coded 2 (average) if they
selected response items 3, 4, or 5, and coded 3 (low) if
response items 6 or 7 were selected.

The coding of INTBUS
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is based on (1) the traditional motivations for direct
foreign investment found in any basic international
economics textbook (see Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1988), and
(2) the arguments presented in the "Risk and Return"
section of Chapter 3.
The relationship between SJV and INTBUS is expected to
be similar to the relationship between SJV and TAC.

If the

Western firm's perception of INTBUS is high, the Western
firm is less likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture and
more likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture if INTBUS
is average or low (see Table 10).

Thus the hypothesis

still shows a strong bivariate relationship in the expected
relationship (x2 = 11.438, P < 05, gamma = .252).

In

addition, it is expected that the perceived level of TAC is
highly correlated with the perceived level of INTBUS.

The

expected relationship is strongly supported by the
bivariate regression analysis presented in Table 10 (Fvalue of 1076.5 (prob = .0001) and a R2 of .68.
The third independent variable in the Soviet joint
venture model is SOVPOL.

SOVPOL is the Western firm's

perception of the Soviet political climate.

SOVPOL is

measured on a four point scale (l=very stable, 2=somewhat
stable, 3=somewhat unstable, 4=very unstable) based upon
Western firms' responses to survey Question 34 in Appendix
1 and survey Question 32 in Appendix 2.
frequency distribution for SOVPOL.

Table 12 shows the
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TABLE 10:: SOVIET JOINT VENTURES BY INTBUS
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF INTBUS
HIGH

SJV
0 (NO)

X2

LOW

TOTAL

62
(12.0%)

62
(12.0%)

48
(9.3%)

172
(33.3%)

81
(15.6%)

126
(24.3%}

139
(26.8)

(66.1%)

143
(27.6%)

188
(36.3%)

187
(36.1%)

518
(100%)

1 (YES)
TOTAL

AVERAGE

= 11. 438

prob. = .003

346

gamma = .252

TABLE 11 : BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
EFFECT OF TAC ON INTBUS
Dependent Variable:
Independent
Variable

INTBUS

Coefficient

S.E.

Constant

.48

.05

TAC

.79

.02

Number of Cases

518

R2

.68

Adjusted R2

.68

F-Value

T-Ratio

32.81*

1076 .57**

*P < Significant at .05 level (.0001)
**p < Significant at .05 level (.0001)

/

The Soviet joint venture model presented in Appendix 3
shows that SOVPOL affects TAC, INTBUS, and SJV.

The

relationships between SOVPOL and TAC and INTBUS is expected
to be similar.

If the perceived level of SOVPOL is 3 or 4

then TAC and INTBUS are expected to be high, but if SOVPOL
is 1 or 2 then TAC and INTBUS should be average or low.
Crosstabulations of the survey sample (both SJV and NO SJV)
presented in Tables 13 and 14 show that the relationships
between SOVPOL and TAC, and SOVPOL and INTBUS are not in
the expected direction, instead they are exactly opposite.
When SOVPOL is 3 or 4 then TAC and INTBUS appear to be
average or low, while TAC and INTBUS are high if SOVPOL is
1 or 2.

In relationship to SJV, Table 15 shows that if

SOVPOL is 1 or 2 then a Western firm is less likely to
engage in a Soviet joint venture and more likely to do so
if SOVPOL is 3 or 4.

However, the results of the bivariate

analysis between TAC and SOVPOL (x2 = 191.391,

p < .05.

gamma = .693), and INTBUS and SOVPOL (x2 = 397.325, p <
.05, gamma = .876) are statistically significant but
substantially insignificant based upon the expected
direction of the relati<

1

Johnson and Joslyn

(1991:313) state that "b. ___ .relationship among a large
sample may attain statistical significance while a strong
relationship withinf a small sample may not . . . chi-square
values tell us tyJe probability that an observed
relationship c^uld have occurred by chance."

The fourth independent variable in the Soviet joint
venture model is SOP.

SOP is the Western firm's perception

of the impact of Soviet government policy on the Western
firm's decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture.

SOP is measured on a four point scale (l=greatly

limits, 2=somewhat limits, 3=somewhat promotes, and
4=greatly promotes) based upon Western firms' responses to
Question 33 in both Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
shows the frequency distribution for SOP.

Table 16

The Soviet joint

venture model suggests that SOP affects TAC, INTBUS, and
SJV.

If SOP equals 1 or 2 it is reasonable to expect that

TAC and INTBUS will be high and that the odds are greater
that the Western firm will not engage in a Soviet joint
venture.
or 4.

The opposite is expected to occur if SOP equals 3
Like SOVPOL, Tables 17 and 18 show that the

relationships between the variables achieve statistical
significance but the direction of the relationship is
completely opposite from the expected relationships.
The fifth independent variable in the Soviet joint
venture model is WESTPOL.

WESTPOL is the Western firm's

perception of the impact of Western governments' policies
on the firm's decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet
joint venture.

WESTPOL is measured on a four point scale

(l=greatly limits, 2=somewhat limits, 3=somewhat promotes,
4=greatly promotes) based on Western firms' responses to
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TABLE 12:

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR SOVPOL

SOVPOL____ FREOUENCY

CUMULATIVE
CUMULATIVE
PERCENT____ FREOUENCY_____ PERCENT

1-Very
Stable

111

21.4

111

21.4

2-Somewhat
Stable

101

19.5

212

40.9

3-Somewhat
Unstable

144

27.8

356

68.7

4-Very
Unstable

162

31.3

513

100.0

TABLE 13:

TRANSACTION COSTS BY SOVIET POLITICAL CLIMATE
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL

TAC

Very
Stable

Somewhat
Stable

Somewhat
Unstable

Very
Unstable

TOTAL

1-High

82
(15.8%)

46
(8.9%)

35
(6.8%)

7
170
(1.3%) (32.8%)

2-Aver

29
(5.6%)

36
(7.0%)

47
(9.0%)

53
165
(10.2%) (31.8%)

3-Low

0
(0%)

19
(3.7%)

62
(12.0%)

102
(19.7%)

183
(35.4%)

101
(20.0%)

144
(27.8%)

162
(31.2%)

518
(100%)

TOTAL
X2

111
(21.4%)

= 191. 391

prob. = .000

gamma = .693
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TABLE 14:

INTBUS BY SOVIET POLITICAL CLIMATE

PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL
Very
Stable

INTBUS

Somewhat
Stable

Somewhat
Unstable

Very
Unstable

TOTAL

1-High

91
(17.6%)

34
(6.6%)

11
(2.1%)

7
(1.3%)

143
(27.3%)

2-Aver

20
(3.9%)

55
(10.6%)

91
(17.6%)

22
(4.2%)

188
(36.3%)

3-Low

0
(0%)

133

187
(36.1%)

TOTAL
X2

111
(21.5%)

= 397 .325

TABLE 15:

12

42

(2.3%)

(8. 1%)

(25.7%)

101
(19.5%)

144
(27.8%)

162
518
(31.2%) (100%)

gamma = .854

prob. = .000

SOVIET JOINT* VENTURES BY SOVIET POLITICAL
CLIMATE
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOVPOL

SJV

Very
Stable

Somewhat
Stable

Somewhat
Unstable

Very
Unstable

TOTAL

0 (NO)

41
(7.9%)

47
(9.1%)

37
(7.1%)

47
(9.1%)

1 (YES)

70
(13.5%)

54
(10.4%)

107
(20.7%)

115
346
(22.2%) (66.8%)

TOTAL

111
(21.4%)

101
(19.5%)

144
(27.8%)

162
518
(31.3%) (100%)

X2

= 13 .735

prob. = .003

172
(33.2%)

gamma = .162
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TABLE 16:

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR SOP

CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY

CUMULATIVE
PERCENT

FREOUENCY

PERCENT

76

14.7

76

14.7

2-Somewhat
Limits

166

32.0

242

46.7

3-Somewhat
Promotes

140

27.0

382

73.7

4-Greatly
Promotes

136

26.3

518

100.0

SOP
1-Greatly
Limits

TABLE 17 : TRANSACTION COSTS BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOP
Greatly
Limits

Somewhat
Limits

Somewhat
Promotes

1-High

39
(7.5%)

63
(12.2%)

35
(6.8%)

33
(6.4%)

2-Aver

11
(2.1%)

20
(3.9%)

56
(10.8%)

78
165
(15.0%) (31.8%)

3-LOW

26
f5.0%)

83

49

25

183

(16.0%)

(9. 5%)

(4.8%)

(35.3%)

76
(14.6%)

166
(32.1%)

140
(27.1%)

136
518
(26.2%) (100%)

TAC

TOTAL
X2

= 94. 424

prob. = .000

Greatly
Promotes TOTAL
170
(32.9%)

gamma =‘ -.012
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TABLE 18:

INTBUS BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF SOP

INTBUS

Greatly
Limits

Somewhat
Limits

Somewhat
Promotes

Greatly
Promotes

TOTAL

1-High

39
(7.5%)

43
(8.3%)

44
(8.5%)

17
(3.3%)

143
(27.6%)

2-Aver

11
(2.1%)

27
(5.2%)

54
(10.4%)

96
188
(18.5%) (36.2%)

3-Low

26
(5.1%)

96
(18.5%)

42
(8.1%)

23
(4.5%)

TOTAL

76
(14.7%)

166
(32.0%)

140
(27.0%)

518
136
(26.3%) (100%)

X2

= 137 .327

prob. = .000

187
(36.2%)

gamma = -.052
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Question 26 in Appendix 1 and Question 21 in Appendix 2.
Table 19 shows the frequency distribution for WESTPOL.
WESTPOL is expected to function in a similar manner to SOP,
if WESTPOL equals 1 or 2 TAC and INTBUS will be high and a
Western firm is unlikely to engage in a Soviet joint
venture.

Also like SOP, the opposite is expected if

WESTPOL equals 3 or 4.

Tables 20 and 21 show a strong

bivariate relationship in the expected direction between
TAC and WESTPOL (x2 = 448.75,

P <_.05, gamma = .922) and

INTBUS and WESTPOL (x2 = 513.79, P < .05, gamma = .935)..
The analysis of the survey data should explain what
factors contribute to the creation and establishment of
Western joint ventures in the Soviet Union.

These results

will be presented in the next section and will demonstrate
that the theoretical conclusions of transaction-cost
analysis can be supported by empirical evidence.

The

findings will be summarized in Chapter 5, followed by a
brief analysis of the potential implications of the
findings for Soviet foreign economic policy.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 22 presents the results of a multivariate
logistic analysis of the following model and research
hypothesis:
Model:

SJV = a + b^TAC) + b2 (INTBUS) + b3 (SOVPOL)
+ b4 (WESTPOL) + b5 (SOP) + e

119
TABLE 19:

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR WESTPOL

CUMULATIVE
FREOUENCY

CUMULATIVE
PERCENT

FREOUENCY

PERCENT

1-Greatly
Limits

149

28.8

149

28.8

2-Somewhat
Limits

170

32.8

319

61.6

3-Somewhat
Promotes

113

21.8

432

83.4

4-Greatly
Promotes

86

16.6

518

100.0

WESTPOL

TABLE 20: TRANSACTION COSTS BY WESTERN
GOVERNMENT POLICY
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF WESTPOL
Greatly
Limits

Somewhat
Limits

1-High

132
(25.5%)

38
(7.3%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

2-Aver

17
(3.3%)

101
(19.5%)

36
(6.9%)

11
165
(2.1%) (31.8%)

TAC

Somewhat
Promotes

Greatly
Promotes TOTAL
170
(32.8%)

3-LOW

0
(0%)

31
(5.9%)

77
(15.0%)

75
183
(14.5%) (35.4%)

TOTAL

149
(28.8%)

170
(32.7%)

113
(21.9%)

518
86
(16.6%)(100%)

X2

= 448 .759

prob. = .000

gamma = .922
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TABLE 21:

INTBUS BY WESTERN GOVERNMENT POLICY

PERCEIVED LEVEL OF WESTPOL
INTBUS

Greatly
Limits

Somewhat
Limits

1-High

116
(22.4%)

27
(5.2%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

143
(27.6%)

2-Aver

33
(6.4%)

125
(24.1%)

19
(3.7%)

11
(2.1%)

188
(36.3%)

(3.5%)

94
(18.1%}

75
187
(14.5%) f36.1%)

170
(32.8%)

113
(21.8%)

86
518
(16.6%) (100%)

3-Low
TOTAL

0
(0%)
149
(28.8%)

x2 = 513 .793

18

Somewhat
Promotes

prob. = .000

Greatly
Promotes

TOTAL

Gamma = .935
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Research Hypothesis: The decision by Western firms to
engage in Soviet joint ventures is the direct or
indirect result of the reduction of the transaction
costs involved in Soviet-Western political economy.
Given the estimated coefficients in Table 22, the logistic
regression equation for the probability of a Western firms
engaging in a Soviet joint venture can be written:
SJV = .42 + .43(TAC) - .99(INTBUS)
- .03(SOVPOL) - .16(SOP) + .23(WESTPOL)
In multiple linear regression the interpretation of the
regression coefficients is straightforward.

It tells the

researcher the amount of change in the dependent variable
for a one-unit change in the independent variable.

The

logistic regression coefficient, however, is interpreted as
the change in the log odds associated with a one-unit
change in the independent variable (e.g., logit =
log[prob(event)/prob(no event)] - B0 + BjX1 + . . . + BpXp)
(Dobson 1990:112).

A positive coefficient increases the

odds of an event for each level of an independent variable
while a negative coefficient decreases the odds (Walsh 1987).
The results of the logistic regression analysis
reveals that the overall model is statistically significant
(P < 0.001) with a chi-square of 23.51 with 5 degrees of
freedom.

Walsh (1987) states that "the significant chi-

square value in the SAS program indicates the independent
variables have significant predictive value."

The results

also reveal that the coefficients for TAC (.43, p = .07)
are marginally significant, very significant for INTBUS
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(-.99, p = .0003), while the coefficients for SOVPOL (.03), SOP (-.16), and WESTPOL (.23) are not.
a multicollinearity problem.

This suggests

Johnson, Johnson, and Buse

(1987:270-273) suggest two methods for solving the problem
of multicollinearity:
One possible way to resolve the problem is to obtain a
new sample. This is easier said than done. In crosssectional studies it may be possible to take a new
sample from the population being studied but it is
seldom practical to do so. Data collection by the
interview method is an expensive undertaking and the
cost of resampling is usually prohibitive . . . A
second possible means of coping with the problem of
multicollinearity is to eliminate one or more of the
variables . . . When there are several explanatory
variables in the equation the problem is more
difficult . . .
it may be that more than one variable
is highly correlated with the same or a different
subset of the remaining variables raising the question
of which variables to delete. An even more serious
potential problem is that deleting relevant variables
can result in the introduction of bias into the
estimates of the coefficients of the variables
retained in the equation.
The Pearson correlation matrix for the variables is
presented in Table 22. The sample correlations between TAC
and INTBUS (.82), TAC and WESTPOL (.79), and TAC and SOVPOL
(.60) are high.

There are also substantial correlations

between INTBUS and WESTPOL (.81), and INTBUS and SOVPOL
(.74).

Moreover, there is a strong correlation

between SOVPOL and WESTPOL (.68).

But "the presence of

simple sample correlation in the sample does not
necessarily mean that the multicollinearity problem exists"
(Johnson, Johnson, and Buse 1987:271).

Dobson (1990:112)

argues that simple correlations among pairs of independent

TABLE 22: LOGISTIC REGRESSION - SOVIET JOINT VENUIRE M3DEL

ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
Parameter
Standard
Wald
HR >
Variable______________Estimate_________ Error________ Chi-Sauare_______Chi-Sauare
Constant

.42

.37

1.30

.26

TAC

.43

.23

3.36

.07

INTBCJS

-.99

.27

13.02

SOVPOL

-.03

.13

.04

.84

SOP

-.16

.10

2.50

.11

.23

.18

1.63

.20

WESTPOL

Chi-Square for Overall Model: 23.50, P = .0003
Number of Cases: 518
Percent Predicted: 83.7

.0003

variables are suggestive but not conclusive.
Multicollinearity can be measured by regressing each
independent variable against all other independent
variables. The resulting R2s measure the level of
multicollinearity.

Employing this method,

multicollinearity is suggested in this study because four
of the five independent variables have a large R2 (TAC=.67,
INTBUS=.79, WESTPOL=.63, SOVPOL=.55, and SOP=.12).
However, it is important to note multicollinearity is not
so much a problem, but rather causes a problem by
increasing the estimates of the standard errors.

This

causes difficulty in obtaining stable or statistically
significant estimates of the effects.

With this caveat,

Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987:275) state "there is no
solution to the problem, short of never doing applied
regression."

As previously stated, removing any of the

independent variables from the model can introduce bias
into the estimates of the coefficients of the independent
variables therefore all of the variables will be retained
in the analysis that follows.
While it is certainly true that every model suffers
from some specification error, the question of
specification is more than simply a technical consideration
in the analysis.
ways.

Specification error can result in two

First, the model may be estimated with the wrong

independent variables by omitting important variables,

TABLE 2 3 :

EEARSQN CORRELATION CDKt'FICLENIB

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > R
SJV
SJV

INTBUS
WESTPOL
SOVPOL
SOP

INTBUS

WESTPOL

SOVPOL

SOP

.06
.16

.15
.00

.05
.24

.10
.02

.09
.05

.06
.16

1 .0 0 0

.82
.00

.79
.00

.60
.00

.005
.89

.15
.00

.82
.00

.81
.00

.74
.00

-.13
.76

.05
.24

.79
.00

.81
.00

.68
.00

-.18
.00

.10
.02

.60
.00

.74
.00

.68
.00

1 .0 0 0

.09
.05

.005
.89

-.13
.76

-.18
.00

-.07
.09

1.000

0.0
TAC

TAC

0.0

1 .0 0 0

0.0

1 .0 0 0

0.0

0.0

-.07
.09
1 .0 0 0

0.0
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including irrelevant variables, or both.

A second form of

misspecification occurs when we have the proper variables
in the model but specify the functional form of the
relationship improperly (Berry and Feldman 1985:18-22;
Achen 1982:51-58).

There is no clear cut way of knowing

that a substantively important variable has been excluded
from an analysis, even after the fact (Berry and Feldman
1985:25).

However, the six conceptual components (the

dependent variable and five independent variables)
presented and operationalized in terms of the hypotheses,
allow for a substantial degree of confidence in the
substantive accuracy of the overall model.

This confidence

is founded not only in the conceptual clarity they
introduce, but also the manner in which they provide a
successful integration of the vast literature on SovietWestern political economy, international political economy,
and transaction-cost analysis.

This confidence in the

conceptualization of the model turns the specification
question into a matter, literally, of best capturing the
concepts.

This study provides an excellent step in this

direction.
The results presented in Table 22 can now be used to
determine the odds of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet
joint venture given its perception of the transaction costs
that may be incurred (TAC), the level of business and
strategic planning risks (INTBUS), the Soviet political
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climate (SOVPOL), the impact of Soviet government policy on
their decision to engage or not engage in a Soviet joint
venture (SOP), and the impact of Western government policy
on its joint venture decision (WESTPOL). This is
accomplished by substituting the parameter estimates for
each of the independent variables into the logistic
regression equation and evaluating various scenarios.
Walsh (1987) states:
This is very much like a prediction equation for
ordinary least squares regression . . . Instead of
calculating the best prediction or score by y, in
logit we are calculating the best probability
prediction.
The results of the logistic regression analysis of the
Soviet joint venture model are summarized in Table 24.
Analyzing the results for TAC demonstrate that the
probability of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet joint
venture decreases as the level of TAC increases, thus the
research hypothesis for the study cannot be rejected.
As previously stated positive coefficients mean the
odds of an event occurring are increased, while the odds of
an event occurring are reduced by negative coefficients.
This holds for the Soviet joint venture model if the odds
of a Western firm engaging in a Soviet joint venture are
calculated from all of the possible scenarios of the
independent variables.

In order to verify the logistic

coefficients a multivariate regression analysis is

T&BEE 24: A TEANSACETCN-OOKr ANAIXSIS OF SOVIET
JOINT VENTURES WITH THE WEST
SJV

TAC

INTBUS

SOVPOL

SOP

WESTPOL

TAOl
TAC=2
TAO=3

-1.2
-.77
-.34

.43
.86
1.29

-2.07
-2.07
-2.07

-.08
-.08
-.08

-.42
-.42
-.42

.52
.52
.52

.31:1
.47:1
.72:1

INTBQS^l
INTEUS=2
INTBUS=3

.32
-.67
-1.66

.87
.87
.87

-.99
-1.98
-2.97

-.08
-.08
-.08

-.42
-.42
-.42

.52
.52
.52

1.38:1
.52:1
.19:1

SOVFOIx=l
S0VP0L=2
S0VP0L=3
S0VP0L=4

-.71
-.74
-.77
-.80

.87
.87
.87
.87

-2.07
-2.07
-2.07
-2.07

-.03
-.06
-.09
-.12

-.42
-.42
-.42
-.42

.52
.52
.52
.52

.49:1
.48:1
.46:1
.44:1

S0P=1
S0P=2
S0P=3
S0P=4

-.50
-.66
-.82
-.98

.87
.87
.87
.87

-2.07
-2.07
-2.07
-2.07

-.08
-.08
-.08
-.08

-.16
-.32
-.48
-.64

.52
.52
.52
.52

.61:1
.51:1
.44:1
.38:1

WESTP0L=1
WESTP0L=2

-1.05
-.82
-.59
-.36

.87
.87
.87
.87

-2.07
-2.07
-2.07
-2.07

-.08
-.08
-.08
-.08

-.42
-.42
-.42
-.42

.23
.46
.69
.92

.35:1
.44:1
.55:1
.70:1

WESTF0Ir=3

WESTP0L=4

ODDS

Constant=.42
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Note: These estimates were obtained by examining various levels of each
independent variable and substituting the mean for all of the other
independent variables.24
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presented in Appendix 3, this analysis further supports the
coefficients and findings of the logistic analysis of the
Soviet joint venture model.
The logistic model with its five conceptual components
is further strengthened by examining the two intervening
conceptual components in the model:

TAC and INTBUS.

The

model indicates that the Western firm's perception of the
level of transaction costs (TAC) that may be incurred by
engaging in a Soviet joint venture is directly affected by
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL.

Table 25 presents a multivariate

ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analysis of the
impact of WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL on TAC.

The estimated

coefficients predict that all three variables will affect
the Western firm's perception of the level of transaction
costs that may be incurred by engaging in a Soviet joint
venture (SJV). All of the independent variables (WESTPOL,
SOVPOL, and SOP) are significant at the .05 significance
level.

In addition, the R2 for the analysis is .66, which

means that the model accounts for approximately 66 percent
of the variance, leaving only 34 percent of the variance
unexplained by these factors.
The Western firm's perception of the level of business
and strategic planning risks involved in engaging or not
engaging in a Soviet joint venture (INTBUS) may account for
some of the unexplained variance found in the multivariate
regression analysis of TAC.

The Soviet joint venture model
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TABUE 25:

Dependent Variable:

OLS COEFFICIENTS FOR TAC

TAC

Independent
Variables_____________ Coefficient_____ S .E._____T-Score
CONSTANT

.16

.09

1.85

WESTPOL

.59

.03

21.03*

SOP

.12

.02

5.76*

SOVPOL

.08

.03

3.14*

R2

.66

Adjusted R2

.66

Number of Cases

518

F-Value

331.10**

*P< Significant at .05 level
**p< Significant at .05 level
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suggests that as a dependent variable INTBUS is directly
and indirectly affected by the independent variables TAC,
WESTPOL, SOP, and SOVPOL.

A multivariate OLS regression

analysis of INTBUS is present in Table 26.

All of the

independent variables are significant and the R2 for the
model is .79.

Thus, the model accounts for approximately

79 percent of the variance leaving only 21 percent of the
variance unexplained by these factors.
The importance of the direct and indirect influence of
WESTPOL, SOVPOL, and SOP on TAC and INTBUS is illustrated
by the multivariate analyses presented in Tables 25 and 26.
Therefore, if WESTPOL, SOVPOL, and SOP all have such an
influence on TAC and INTBUS they should remain in the
logistic regression analysis of the Soviet joint venture
model.

As previously stated, if either WESTPOL, SOVPOL, or

SOP is eliminated from the logistic regression model it is
possible that the coefficient estimates would be biased.
In summary, the data are favorable toward all of the
conceptual components developed above in the Soviet joint
venture model.

The importance of the Western firm’s

perception of (1) the level of transaction costs that may
be incurred by engaging in a Soviet joint venture, and (2)
the level of business and strategic planning of a Soviet
joint venture are among the major findings.

Thus, the

analysis helps to explain some of the factors that
contribute to Soviet joint ventures with the West.

The
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TABLE 26:
Dependent Variable:

OLS COEFFICIENTS FOR INTBUS
INTBUS

Independent
Variable

Coefficient

S.E.

T-Scor<

CONSTANT

.092

.06

1.44

TAC

.39

.04

11.97*

WESTPOL

.22

.03

7.66*

SOP

.05

.02

2.86*

SOVPOL

.22

.02

11.16*

R2

.79

Adjusted R2

.79

Number of Cases

518

F-Value

498.26**

*P< Significant at .05 level
**P< Significant at .05 level

theoretical conclusions of Chapter 3 are thereby supported
by the empirical evidence presented here.

The IPE

literature is currently dominated by theories designed
to explain political and economic relations among states
with well-established, functioning free market economies, a
characteristic not yet found in the Soviet Union.
Therefore, transaction-cost analysis provides an additional
theoretical framework that can be integrated into the
existing IPE literature in order to help explain political
and economic relations among states with different types of
political and economic systems (e.g., the United States and
its free market economy, and the Soviet Union and its
centrally planned economy). Questions remain, however,
concerning the implications of the analysis for Soviet
foreign economic policy and Soviet joint ventures with the
West in light of the recent political personnel and policy
changes in the Soviet Union.

The concluding chapter will

demonstrate that the Soviet joint venture model and
transaction-cost analysis are viable social scientific
tools in researching Soviet foreign economic policy.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was threefold (1) to explain
the factors that contribute to the establishment of Soviet
joint ventures with the West, (2) to integrate a relatively
new theoretical framework within the existing IPE theories
to bear directly on the problem of Soviet-Western political
economy, and (3) to speculate about the effect of Soviet
joint ventures with the West on Soviet-Western economic and
political relations.

In the previous chapters, goals one

and two were somewhat achieved.

Transaction-cost analysis'

emphasis on institutions, contracts, economic conditions,
political conditions, rules, enforcement, and opportunism
provides an analytical framework that can help explain the
role of these variables in governing and facilitating
Soviet-Western political economy.

Eggertsson (1990:15)

states that there are six activities related to political
and economic exchanges between states, firms, or
individuals that give rise to transaction costs:
1. The search for information about the distribution
of price and quality of commodities and labor inputs,
and the search for potential buyers and sellers and
for relevant information about their behavior and
circumstances.
2. The bargaining that is needed to find the true
position of buyers and sellers when prices are
endogenous.
3.

The making of contracts.

4. The monitoring of contractual partners to see
whether they abide by the terms of the contract.
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5. The enforcement of a contract and the collection
of damages when partners fail to observe their
contractual relations.
6. The protection of property rights against thirdparty encroachment - for example, protection against
pirates or even against the government in the case of
illegitimate trade.
The world of the new economics of organization (NEO)
is one where uncertainty and opportunism exist, thereby
reguiring complex institutional structures and arrangements
for the (1) the establishment of economic and political
relations, and (2) the reduction or elimination of
transaction costs.

The NEO environment provides a very

precise description of the international political economy
(IPE) and of Soviet-Western political economy.

In Power

and Interdependence. Keohane and Nye (1988:253-254) state:
From the foreign policy standpoint, the problem facing
individual governments is how to benefit from
international exchange while maintaining as much
autonomy as possible. From the perspective of the
international system, the problem is how to generate
and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of
cooperation in the face of competing efforts by
governments, and nongovernmental actors, to manipulate
the system for their own benefit.
The NEO environment and the IPE in a world of complex
interdependence are very similar in nature, therefore,
transaction-cost analysis provides an added dimension to
the study of IPE, Soviet-Western political economy, and
Soviet foreign economic policy by providing a framework for
studying political and economic relations among states in
the international system with different and similar
political and economic structures.

136

Stephen Krasner suggests that transaction-cost
analysis is not logically inconsistent with the traditional
power-oriented research program of international politics.
Krasner (1991:362) states:
The most important issues for a power-oriented
analysis is the distribution of capabilities and
benefits. Charles Perrow, for instance, argues there
is always a struggle within an institution because
control of the institution can bring with it a variety
of rewards including security, power, and survival.
For a power-oriented research program, power is
exercised not to facilitate cooperation but to secure
a more favorable distribution of benefits. And
analysis seeks to explain outcomes in terms of
interests and relative capabilities rather than in
terms of institutions designed to promote Pareto
optimality.
Transaction-cost analysis' focus on institutions is also
designed to explain outcomes in terms of interests and
relative capabilities.

It is precisely the interests or

capabilities of states, firms, or individuals that may
increase or reduce the cost of transacting between economic
and political agents.
The empirical analysis of the survey data offers some
support for the theoretical conclusions of NEO and
transaction-cost analysis.

The empirical results found

that the decision by a Western firm to engage or not engage
in a joint venture may be directly or indirectly influenced
by that firm's perception of the level of transaction costs
that could be incurred in such a venture.

The data also

indicate that the perceived level of transaction costs is
influenced by the Western firm's perception of Western
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government policy, Soviet government policy, and the Soviet
political climate.

If the perceived level of transaction

costs is high, the data suggest that a Western firm is less
likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture.

On the other

hand, if the perceived level of transaction costs is
average or low, the data suggest that a Western firm is
more likely to engage in a Soviet joint venture.
The third objective of this study was to speculate
about the effect of Soviet joint ventures with the West on
Soviet-Western economic and political relations to
determine if joint ventures would significantly effect
Soviet-Western political economy.

As stated in Chapter 1,

when this study began the Soviet Union under the leadership
of President Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to be moving toward
a free market economy and complete integration of the
Soviet Union into the established international political
economy.

However, since the summer of 1990 numerous events

have occurred in the Soviet Union that appear to have
shifted the direction of Gorbachev's program of
perestroika, thus resulting in questions about the
applicability of the Soviet joint venture model developed
and tested in this study.

However, in the area of Soviet-

Western political economy the Soviet Union continues to
move toward greater economic reform and liberalization as
demonstrated by recent (1) legislation of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, (2) legislation of the most economically important
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republics in the Soviet Union (e.g., the Baltics and
Russia), and (3) Presidential Decrees issued by Gorbachev.
The result, noted earlier, has been a 42 percent increase
in Soviet joint ventures with the West between September 1,
1990 and March 1, 1991.
Cooperation in the liberalization of Soviet-Western
political economy must continue if the Soviet Union wants
to shake its permanently developing country (PDC) image and
become a major player in the IPE.

This requires that the

Soviet government, and the governments of the various
republics, make the Soviet Union even more attractive to
Western investors by further reducing the level of
transaction costs and the level of business and strategic
planning risks involved in doing business in the Soviet
Union.

Because in a world of complex interdependence high

levels of TAC and INTBUS may reduce cooperation and
increase the potential for opportunism.
The theoretical discussion of NEO and transaction
costs in Chapter 3 and the empirical analysis of the Soviet
joint venture model demonstrate that this study, its
theoretical assumptions, and the model are still
appropriate research tools even if the Soviet Union is
moving from policies of liberalization to Communist Party
hardline policies of retrenchment.

The Soviet Union, like

the NEO world, is a world where, for example, "individuals
are only bounded rationally, legal enforcement of

agreements is costly and imperfect, and opportunistic acts
cannot be ruled out" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:239).
This makes cooperation difficult, "even when all parties
are acting in good faith, and it therefore creates a demand
for norms to enhance predictability and political and
economic institutions to support exchange and other forms
of cooperation" (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990:240).
Uncertainty can also be increased if actors are engaging in
opportunistic behavior, strategic behavior that is designed
to deliberately conceal an actor's preferences or actions
in order to achieve gains that improves its position while
threatening the welfare and utility of other actors
(Hodgson 1988:37-40).

Obviously, the Soviet Union in 1991

fits the criteria of NEO and transaction-cost analysis.
The Soviet joint venture model and its theoretical
assumptions are adaptable to other areas of Soviet foreign
economic relations with the West, such as the decision to
engage or not engage in trade with the Soviet Union.

This

study suggests that many Western foreign economic decisions
are based upon the variables of (1) Western government
policy, (2) Soviet government policy. (3) Soviet political
climate, (4) the level of transaction costs, and (5) the
business and strategic planning risks.

The theoretical

arguments demonstrate that these factors may be some of the
most crucial in a Western firm's decisionmaking process
regarding doing business in the Soviet Union.
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Transaction-cost analysis appears to be a more
rigorous and precise research tool for the study of SovietWestern political economy as the Soviet Union continues to
move toward a free market economy and becomes more
integrated into the international political economy.

In

War and Change in World Politics. Robert Gilpin presents an
argument which gives further credence to a transaction-cost
analysis of Soviet joint ventures with the West when the
current political situation in the Soviet Union within the
context of the IPE is taken into consideration.

Gilpin

(1981:231-233) states:
A further reason for the rise and spread of a market
economy and for its impact was a decrease in
transaction costs, especially the costs of defining
and enforcing property rights. . . In the new
international environment created by the advent of
sustained economic growth and a world market economy,
the tendency of states to expand as their power grew
underwent a profound transformation. Whereas in the
premodern world, expansion principally took the form
of territorial expansion, political expansion and
economic expansion have tended to characterize growing
states in the modern world. The primary objectives of
increasing numbers of states have been to extend their
political influence over other states and to increase
their dominance over the world market economy.
Through specialization and international trade an
efficient state could gain more than through
territorial expansion and conquest. The expanded
market and the diversity of available resources made
possible by trade were spurs to growth of wealth and
power of those states best able to take advantage of
the change in world conditions. For these states,
trade proved to be more profitable than imperial
tribute.
The Soviet Union now appears to be attempting to
follow a path of market reform in order to increase its
wealth and power which would allow it to maintain its

superpower status in the international system.

Thus,

transaction-cost analysis appears to offer greater
empirical verisimilitude than any other existing IPE model
for the study of Soviet-Western political economy.
Transaction-cost analysis provides the basis for not only
examining the amount of overall trade and business between
the Soviet Union and the West in joint ventures and other
business arrangements, but can also examine and explain the
nature and impact of those relationships on the
international political economy.
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QUESTIONNAIRE:

1.

How would you describe your firm's attitude toward
doing business with the Soviet Union?
65%

1. Very willing to do business with the Soviet
Union.

35%

2. Have minor reservation about doing business
with the Soviet Union, but anxious to
explore possibilities with the Soviet Union
to become established in Soviet market.

0%

3. Willing to explore, but have serious
reservations about doing business with the
Soviet Union.

0%

4. Little interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.

0%

5. No interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.

100%
2.

APPENDIX 1
WESTERN FIRMS INVOLVED IN JOINT VENTURES
WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Total

N=346

Does your firm conduct business in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes

0

No

N=346
3.

Has your firm entered into a joint venture agreement
with a firm in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes

0

N=346
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No

What type of international business activity, other
than joint ventures, does your firm primarily conduct
in the USSR?
22%

1.

International trade.

75%

2.

Licensing agreements.

3%

3.

Plant and equipment transfers.

0%

4.

Subcontracting.

0%

5.

Co-production.

0%

6.

Other (please specify). No Responses.

100%

Total

N=346

I would like for your firm to rate the desirability of
the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business
partner on a scale of 0 to 10. For example, if you
rate the desirability of the Soviet Union as a foreign
customer or business partner as average, give it a
rating of 5. If you rate the desirability of the
Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business partner
as above average, give it a rating of 6 to 10. If you
rate the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or
business partner as below average, give it a rating
from 0 to 4.
Average Rating

6.5

In order to compare the desirability of the Soviet
Union as a foreign customer or business partner,please
rate the desirability of the following countries as a
foreign customer or business partner based on the same
scale used in Question 6 .
Brazil

6.6

Israel

4.8

South Africa

8.2

Canada

5.9

Italy

6.4

South Korea

4.3

Egypt

8.5

Japan

5.7

Spain

f'-

France

5.1

Mexico

5.1

Sweden

7.9

Britain

6.3

PRC

8.3

United States

3.4

Hungary

5.2

Poland

4.6

Venezuela

CO
•

3.6

4.7

India
5.8 Saudi Arabia8.1 West Germany
Scores Reflect Average Ratings for Survey
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7.

What is the name of your firm's joint venture in the
Soviet Union?

THIS INFORMATION WILL BE USED TO AVOID DUPLICATION.
SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL
AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.
8.

9.

10.

How is the percentage share of the joint venture
distributed?
Your firm

46.9%

Soviet firm

51.3%

Other firms

1.8%

AVERAGE

Name the home base country of other firms involved in
your joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?

Is your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union fully
operational?
59%

Yes

41%

No

N=346
11.

If your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union is
not fully operational, what is its current stage of
operation?
34%

1. Planning and development.

29%

2. Construction.

12%

3. On Hold.

25%

4. Other (please specify). Soviet partner
contribution._________________________

100%

Total

N=346
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12.

If your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union is on
hold, which of the following factors have contributed
most significantly to the delay?
12%

1.

Soviet legal barriers.

6%

2.

Soviet financial and economic barriers.

18%

3.

Managerial/personnel problems.

6%

4.

Soviet infrastructure/bureaucratic problems.

0%

5.

Lack of agreement on goals

18%

6.

Repatriation of profit problems.

0%

7.

Western government policies.

40%

8.

Other (please specify). Soviet partner
contribution.

100 %

Total

N=17
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13.

How important was each of the following factors in
your firm's decision to engage in a joint venture
agreement in the Soviet Union?

Factor

Very
Somewhat
Not
Not
Important Important Important Sure

Soviet Political Climate

42%

53%

5%

0%

Marketing

18%

63%

19%

0%

Research and Development

81%

12%

7%

0%

Home Government Policies

20%

56%

24%

0%

Trade Barriers

11%

72%

17%

0%

Capital Investment

28%

40%

32%

0%

5%

27%

68%

0%

Production/Technology

34%

57%

9%

0%

Information

12%

28%

60%

0%

World Economy

26%

23%

25%

26%

1%

3%

5%

91%

Soviet Government Policies

34%

32%

34%

0%

Repatriation of Profits

75%

25%

0%

0%

Soviet Infrastructure

16%

38%

40%

6%

Soviet Financial Barriers

23%

28%

35%

14%

Lack of Agreement on Goals

31%

33%

25%

11%

Managerial Problems

47%

30%

23%

0%

Personnel Problems

41%

34%

25%

0%

Soviet Legal Barriers

25%

32%

43%

0%

Governance and Maintenance
of Soviet Relationship

18%

22%

66%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Labor

Soviet Monopsony Power

Other: No Responses
(Please Specify)
N=346 For Each Factor
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14.

Does your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union
require a marketing effort?
100%

Yes

0%

No

N=346
If you answered yes to Question 14 please answer Question
15.
If you answered no to Question 14 please go to
Question 16.
15.

How much marketing effort is required to sell products
or services in the Soviet Union?
61%

1.

Much more than average foreign customer.

21%

2.

Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.

0%
10%
8%

3. Not sure.
4. Level of required marketing is about the same.
5. Less expensive than for most foreign
customers.

100%
16.

Total

N=346

How reliable are the Soviets in complying with
contract agreements?
22%
46%
0%
32%
0%
100%

1. Very reliable.
2.

Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.

3. Uncertain.
4. Sometimes does not meet agreement.
5. Never meets agreements.
Total

N=346
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17.

In what area of industry will your firm's joint
venture activity in the Soviet Union primarily occur?
5%

8%

24!

1.

Chemical

2.

Energy (oil,
gas, other)

3.

Computer/

4.

Food

5.

Service
(hotels,
tourism, etc.)

Machinery/Heavy
Industry
Consumer Products

22 %

8

Agriculture

15‘

9,

Medical

2%

10.

Total

100 ^

18.

N=346

In which Soviet Republic is your firm's joint venture
located?
1.

Russia

0%

9.

5%

2.

Estonia

0%

10.

Molvavia

3%

3.

Ukraine

4%

11.

Latvia

2%

4 . Georgia

0%

12.

Kazakhstan

3%

5.

Lithuania

0%

13.

Kirghizia

1%

6.

Belorussia

0%

14.

Turkmenistan

0%

7.

Armenia

0%

15.

Tazdzhikistan

0%

8.

Uzbekistan

82%

19.

Other (Please
Specify):
Telecommunications

100%

Azerbaijan

Total N=346

To what market is the final products of your firm's
joint venture in the Soviet Union targeted?
28%

1.

Soviet domestic market.

12%

2.

Home domestic market.

60%

3.

World market.

0%

4.

Other (please specify). No Resoonses.

100%

Total

N=346
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20.

21.

What is the estimated initial capital investment for
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
1%

1.

Over $30 million

2%

2.

$20 - 29 million

34%

3.

$10 - 19 million

41%

4.

$ 1 - 9 million

17%

5.

$500,000 - 1 million

5%

6.

$100,000 - 500,000

1%

7.

Under $100,000

100%

8.

Total

N=346

What is the estimated annual operational costs for
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
1%

1.

Over $30 million

1%

2.

$20 - 29 million

32%

3.

$10 - 19 million

28%

4.

$ 1 - 9 million

36%

5.

$500,000 - 1 million

2%

6.

$100,000 - 500,000

0%

7.

Under $100,000

100%

8.

Total

N=346
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22.

What is the estimated annual revenue for
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
0%

1.

Over $30 million

4%

2.

$20 - 29 million

33%

3. $10 - 19 million

38%

4. $ 1 - 9 million

25%

5. $500,000 - 1 million

0%

6. $100,000 - 500,000

0%

7. Under $100,000

100%
23.

43%

N=346

1. Barter arrangements.
2.

Trading goods from the joint venture on the
international market.

15%

3. Hard currency auctions.

18%

4. Consortia.

0%
100%

5. Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=346

What type
of technology is required for your firm's
joint ventures in the Soviet Union?
78%

1. General purpose or standardized technology.

22%

2. Transaction-specific technology

100%
NOTE

Total

How does your firm plan to repatriate profits from
its joint venture in the Soviet Union?
24%

24.

8.

Total

(see note).

N=346

Transaction-specific technology is technology that
is idiosyncratic to a particular business
relationship, the loss of this relationship would
result in significant excess capacity and other
associated losses.
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25.

Of the following Western government policies, which
has had or will have the most adverse effect on your
firm's joint venture project in the Soviet Union?
32%

1.

Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).

21%

2.

Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.

27%

3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.

20%

4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).

0%
100%
26.

5. Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=346

How would your firm describe the impact of Western
governments' policy on your firm's decision to engage
in a Soviet joint venture?
20%

1. Greatly limits.

31%

2. Somewhat limits.

27%

3. Somewhat promotes.

22%

4. Greatly promotes.

100%

Total

N=346
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27.

The costs of information, including the supplying and
the learning of the terms on which transactions are to
be carried out (the rules of the game), are frequently
associated with market exchange. Contracts and laws
are the formal means by which firms and governments
attempt to limit the strategic use of information and
thereby reducing the costs of information. How would
your firm describe the Soviet Joint Venture Law and
your finn's joint venture agreement in limiting the
strategic use of information by all parties involved,
thereby reducing the costs of information?
54%

1. Greatly limits and reduces the strategic use
and costs of information.

41%

2. Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.

0%

3. Uncertain.

5%

4. Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of
information.

0%

5. Very ambiguous andsubstantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of
information.

100%
28.

Total

N=346

What mechanism is provided for in your firm's joint
venture agreement in the Soviet Union to ensure the
proper governance and maintenance of the joint
venture?
34%

1. Arbitration.

24%

2. Direct negotiations between all parties of
the joint venture agreement.

7%

3. Adjudication.

35%

4.

Abrogation of the joint venture agreement if
any of the contracting parties renege.

0%

5.

Other (please specify).

100%

Total

N=346

No responses.
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29.

How do you think the mechanism selected in Question 28
will effect the costs of maintaining and governing
your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union, and the
potential for opportunism and defection by all parties
involved in the agreement?
58%

1. Greatly reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.

40%

2. Somewhat reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.

0%

3.

2%

4. Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.

0%

5. Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.

100%
30.

Total

N=346

In length of years, what is the average contract term
of your firm's joint venture in the Soviet Union?
3%

1.

10 years or more.

53%

2.

5 - 9 years.

44%

3.

1 - 4 years.

0%

4.

Less than a year.

100%
31.

Uncertain.

Total

N=346

What were the biggest surprises or unanticipated costs
of your firm's joint venture project in the Soviet
Union?
Level of cooperation and willingness to work exhibited
by Soviet co-workers._______________________________

32.

If your firm had the opportunity to do it all again,
what would your firm do differently as it negotiated
and engaged in a joint venture project in the Soviet
Union?
Negotiate for 100 percent ownership of joint venture.
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33.

How would your firm describe the impact of Soviet
government policy on your firm's decision to engage in
a joint venture?
9%

1. Greatly limits.

25%

2. Somewhat limits.

31%

3. Somewhat promotes.

35%

4. Greatly promotes.

100%
34.

Total

How would your firm describe the current political
climate in the Soviet Union?
19%

1. Very stable.

22%

2. Somewhat stable.

27%

3. Somewhat unstable.

32%

4. Very unstable.

100%
35.

N=346

Total

N=346

Of the following events, which one would have to occur
and negatively alter the Soviet political climate in
order for your firm to end all business relations with
the Soviet Union?
5%

1. Secession of the Soviet Republics.

15%

2. The ouster of MikhailGorbachev as
President.

80%

3. Civil War in the Soviet Union.

0%
0%
100%

4. Economic depression.
5.

Other (please specify).
Total

N=346

No responses.
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36.

Please provide any comments about doing business with
the Soviet Union or this survey you think might be
helpful:
No responses.______________________________________

37.

General Information:
Name and title of person answering survey;
Name_____________________

Title_________________

Company Address:

Phone Number:____________
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE WITH THIS SURVEY.
ALL
INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IS
CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.

APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE: WESTERN FIRMS NOT INVOLVED IN SOVIET JOINT
VENTURES BUT DOING BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
How would you describe your firm's attitude toward
doing business with the Soviet Union?
71%

1.

Very willing to do business with
the Soviet Union.

29%

2.

Have minor reservation about doing
business with the Soviet Union, but
anxious to explore possibilities with
the Soviet Union to become established
in Soviet market.

0%

3.

Willing to explore, but have serious
reservations about doing business with the
Soviet Union.

0%

4.

Little interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.

0%

5.

No interest in doing business with the
Soviet Union.

100%

Total

N=172

Does your firm conduct business in the Soviet Union?
100% Yes

0

No

N=172
Has your firm entered into a joint venture agreement
with a firm in the Soviet Union?
0% Yes

100%

No

N=172
Is your firm currently in the process of negotiating
a joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?
15%

Yes
N=172
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85%

No
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5.

What type of international business activity, other
than joint ventures, does your firm primarily conduct
in the USSR?
25%

1.

International trade.

53%

2.

Licensing agreements.

8%

3.

Plant and equipment transfers.

10%

4.

Subcontracting.

4%

5.

Co-production.

0%

6.

Other (please specify). No Responses.

100%
6.

Total

N=172

I would like for your firm to rate the desirability of
the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business
partner on a scale of 0 to 10. For example, if you
rate the desirability of the Soviet Union as a foreign
customer or business partner as average, give it a
rating of 5. If you rate the desirability of the
Soviet Union as a foreign customer or business partner
as above average, give it a rating of 6 to 10. If you
rate the Soviet Union as a foreign customer or
business partner as below average, give it a rating
from 0 to 4.
Average Rating

7.

6.1

In order to compare the desirability of the Soviet
Union as a foreign customer or business partner,
please rate the desirability of the following
countries as a foreign customer or business partner
based on the same scale used in Question 6.
Brazil

6.3

Israel

4.3

South Africa

8 .1

Canada

6.2

Italy

6.3

South Korea

4.0

Egypt

8.3

Japan

5.9

Spain

France

5.2

Mexico

5.0

Sweden

r—1
•
CO

Britain

5.9

PRC

8.6

United States

3.2

Hungary

5.2

Poland

5.1

Venezuela

CO
•

2.9

4.9

India
5.6
Saudi ArabiaS.4 West Germany
Scores Reflect Average Ratings for Survey
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8.

How important was each of the following factors in
your firm's decision not to engage in a joint venture
agreement in the Soviet Union?

Factor

Very
Somewhat
Not
Not
Important Important Important Sure

Soviet Political Climate

94%

6%

0%

0%

Marketing

21%

31%

48%

0%

Research and Development

55%

36%

9%

0%

Home Government Policies

24%

61%

15%

0%

Trade Barriers

10%

55%

35%

0%

Capital Investment

73%

25%

2%

0%

Labor

12%

37%

51%

0%

Production/Technology

76%

15%

9%

0%

Information

80%

18%

2%

0%

World Economy

19%

25%

40%

16%

2%

1%

5%

92%

Soviet Government Policies

50%

40%

10%

0%

Repatriation of Profits

57%

39%

4%

0%

Soviet Infrastructure

73%

25%

2%

0%

Soviet Financial Barriers

21%

60%

19%

0%

Lack of Agreement on Goals

53%

37%

10%

0%

Managerial Problems

15%

39%

37%

9%

Personnel Problems

20%

46%

22%

12%

Soviet Legal Barriers

63%

35%

2%

0%

Governance and Maintenance
of Soviet Relationship

83%

16%

1%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Soviet Monopsony Power

Other: No Responses
(Please Specify)
N=172 For Each Factor
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9.

Does your firm's business activity with the Soviet
Union require a marketing effort?
52%

Yes

48%

No

N=172
If you answered yet to Question 9 please answer Question
10. If you answered no to Question 9 please go to Question
11

.

10.

How much marketing effort is required to sell products
or services in the Soviet Union?
48%

1. Much more than average foreign customer.

36%

2. Initial sales require more marketing effort,
but repeat sales do not.

0%
10%
6%
100%
11.

3. Not sure.
4. Level of required marketing is about the same.
5. Less expensive than for most foreign
customers.
Total

N=89

How reliable are the Soviets in complying with
contract agreements?
21%

1. Very reliable.

34%

2. Meets agreements, but exploits loopholes.

0%
36%
9%
100%

3. Uncertain.
4. Sometimes does not meet agreement.
5. Never meets agreements.
Total

N=172
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12.

In what area of industry does your firm primarily
conduct business in the Soviet Union?
22%

1.

Chemical

18%

2.

Energy (oil,
gas, other)

8?

3.

Computer/

0‘

4.

Food

2%

0%

5.

Service
(hotels,
tourism, etc.)

0%

35%

6. Machinery/Heavy
Industry

4%

7. Consumer Products

11%

8. Agriculture
9. Medical
10. Other (Please
Specify):
Total

100 ?

13.

In which Soviet Republic is does your firm primarily
conduct business?
1.

Russia

0%

9.

5%

2.

Estonia

0%

10.

Molvavia

4%

3.

Ukraine

2%

11.

Latvia

3%

4.

Georgia

0%

12.

Kazakhstan

4%

5.

Lithuania

0%

13.

Kirghizia

2%

6 . Belorussia

0%

14.

Turkmenistan

1%

7.

Armenia

0%

15.

Tazdzhikistan

0%

8.

Uzbekistan

79%

14.

N=172

100%

Azerbaijan

Total N=172

To what market is the final products of your firm's
business activity in the Soviet Union targeted?
56?

1.

Soviet domestic market.

15%

2.

Home domestic market.

29%

3.

World market.

0%

4.

Other (please specify).

100%

Total

N=172

No Responses,
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15.

16.

What is the estimated initial capital investment for
your firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
1%

1 . Over $30 million

2%

2.

$20 - 29 million

31%

3.

$10 - 19 million

22%

4.

$ 1 - 9 million

16%

5.

$500,000 - 1 million

23%

6.

$100,000 - 500,000

5%

7.

Under $100,000

100%

8.

Total

N=172

What is the estimated annual o]
your firm's business activity :
1%

1 . Over $30 million

4%

2.

$20 - 29 million

9%

3.

$10 - 19 million

49%

4.

$ 1 - 9 million

19%

5.

$500,000 - 1 million

16%

6.

$100,000 - 500,000

2%

7.

Under $100,000

100%

8.

Total

N=172
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17.

18.

What is the estimated annual revenue for
your firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
0%

1.

Over $30 million

3%

2.

$20 - 29 million

39%

3.

$10 - 19 million

30%

4.

$ 1 - 9 million

23%

5.

$500,000 - 1 million

4%

6.

$100,000 - 500,000

0%

7.

Under $100,000

100%

8.

Total

How does your firm plan to repatriate profits from
its business activity in the Soviet Union?
72%

l. Barter arrangements.

28%

2. Trading goods from the joint venture on the
international market.

0%

3. Hard currency auctions.

0%

4. Consortia.

0%

5. Other (please specify). No responses.

100%
19.

Total

N=172

What type of technology is required for your firm's
business activity in the Soviet Union?
67%

1. General purpose or standardized technology.

33%

2. Transaction-specific technology (see note).

100%
NOTE:

N=172

Total

N=172

Transaction-specific technology is technology that
is idiosyncratic to a particular business
relationship, the loss of this relationship would
result in significant excess capacity and other
associated losses.
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20.

Of the following Western government policies, which
has had or will have the most adverse effect on your
firm's business activity in the Soviet Union?
25%

1.

Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).

13%

2.

Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.

22%

3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.

40%

4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).

0%
100%

5. Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=172

2 1 . How would your firm describe the impact of Western

governments' policy on your firm's decision not to
engage in a Soviet joint venture?
45%

1. Greatly limits.

37%

2. Somewhat limits.

12%

3. Somewhat promotes.

6%

4. Greatly promotes.

100%

Total

N=172
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22.

The costs of information, including the supplying and
the learning of the terms on which transactions are to
be carried out (the rules of the game), are frequently
associated with market exchange. Contracts and laws
are the formal means by which firms and governments
attempt to limit the strategic use of information and
thereby reducing the costs of information. How would
your firm describe the contractual agreement(s) with its
Soviet business partner(s) in limiting the
strategic use of information by all parties involved,
thereby reducing the costs of information?
0%
30%
0%

Greatly limits and reduces the strategic use
and costs of information.

2. Somewhat limits and reduces the strategic
use and costs of information.
3. Uncertain.

55%

4. Somewhat ambiguous and provides minimal
opportunity for the strategic use of
information.

15%

5. Very ambiguous and substantially increases
the opportunity for the strategic use of
information.

100%
23.

1.

Total

N=172

What mechanism is provided for in your firm's
contractual agreement(s) with its Soviet business
partners to ensure the proper governance and maintenance
of the business relationship?
0%
18%
0%
82%
0%
100%

1. Arbitration.
2. Direct negotiations between all parties of
the joint venture agreement.
3. Adjudication.
4. Abrogation of the jointventure agreement if
any of the contracting parties renege.
5. Other (please specify).
Total

N=172

Noresponses.

172

24.

How do you think the mechanism selected in Question 23
will effect the costs of maintaining and governing
your firm's business activities in the Soviet Union, and
the potential for opportunism and defection by all
parties involved in the agreement?
0%
38%
0%

3. Uncertain.
4. Somewhat increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.

12%

5. Greatly increases the costs and the
potential for opportunism and defection.
Total

N=172

In length of years, what is the average contract term
of your firm's business activities in the Soviet Union?
10%

1. 10 years or more.

50%

2. 5 - 9 years.

38%

3. 1 - 4 years.

2%
26.

2. Somewhat reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.

50%

100%
25.

1. Greatly reduces the costs and the potential
for opportunism and defection.

4. Less than a year.

What were the biggest surprises or unanticipated costs
of your firm's business activities in the Soviet
Union?
Level of cooperation and willingness to work exhibited
bv Soviet co-workers._______________________________

27.

If your firm had the opportunity to do it all again,
what would your firm do differently as it negotiated
and engaged in business activities in the Soviet
Union?
Seek greater control over business activity._________
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28.

What aspect of Soviet policy wouldhave to change to
make your firm reconsider its decisionnot toengage
in a joint venture agreement in the Soviet Union?
30%

1. Convertible ruble.

25%

2. Implementation of market economy in USSR.

11%

3. Increased economic efficiency and improvement
in the quality of Soviet products and
services.

2%

4. Improved business hospitality in the Soviet
Union (e.g., better hotels, services,
entertainment).

6%

5.

More political reform.

4%

6.

More economic reform.

22%

7.

100%
29.

Other (please specify). 100 Percent____
Ownership________________________________
Total

N=172

Which of the following Western government policies
had the most impact on your firm's decision not to
engage in a joint venture project in the Soviet Union?
35%
15%

1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).
2.

Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.

21%

3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.

29%

4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).

0%
100%

5. Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=172
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30.

Which of the following Western government policies
would most definitely have to change to make your firm
reconsider its decision not to engage in a joint venture
project in the Soviet Union?
35%
15%

Controls and legal restrictions on extending
credit to the Soviet Union.

3. Failure to give the Soviet Union most
favored nation (MFN) status.

29%

4. Multilateral restrictions agreed upon by
GATT and the OECD (e.g., anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws).

100%

5. Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=172

What factor do you think would contribute significantly
to the Soviet Union becoming a major actor in the world
economy?
34%

1. Convertible ruble.

46%

2. Implementation of market economy in USSR.

13%

3. Increased economic efficiency and improvement
in the quality of Soviet products and
services.

7%

4. Stable political climate.

0%

5. Other (please specify)

100%
32.

2.

21%

0%

31.

1. Trade barriers (e.g., export and import
controls).

Total

No responses._____

N=172

How would your firm describe the current political
climate in the Soviet Union?
26%

1. Very stable.

14%

2. Somewhat stable.

30%

3. Somewhat unstable.

30%

4. Very unstable.

100%

Total

N=172
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33.

How would your firm describe the impact of Soviet
government policy on your firm's decision not to engage
in a joint venture?
27%

1.

Greatly limits.

45%

2.

Somewhat limits.

19%

3 . Somewhat promotes.

9%

4.

100%
34.

Total

N=172

Of the following events, which one would have to occur
and negatively alter the Soviet political climate in
order for your firm to end all business relations with
the Soviet Union?
4%

1. Secession of the Soviet Republics.

16%

2. The ouster of Mikhail Gorbachev as
President.

80%

3. Civil War in the Soviet Union.

0%
0%
100%
35.

Greatly promotes.

4. Economic depression.
5.

Other (please specify). No responses.
Total

N=172

Please provide any comments about doing business with
the Soviet Union or this survey you think might be
helpful:
No responses._______________________________________
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36.

General Information:
Name and title of person answering survey:
Name_____________________

Title________

Company Address:

Phone Number:____________
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE WITH THIS SURVEY.
ALL
INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IS
CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC.

APPENDIX 3
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF SOVIET JOINT VENTURE MODEL

Dependent Variable:
Independent
Variables

SJV
Coefficient

S.E.

T-Score

CONSTANT

.41

.08

5.063

TAC

.08

.05

1.755*

-.21

.06

-3.633**

.05

.04

1.256

SOP

-.04

.02

-1.594

SOVPOL

-.01

.03

-0.200

INTBUS
WESTPOL

R2

.04

Adjusted R2

.04

F-Value
Number of Cases

4.756**
518

*P< Significant at .10 level
**P< Significant at .05 level

In order to assess the positive and negative signs of
the coefficients in the logisitic analysis of the Soviet
joint venture model a multivariate regression analysis was
run.
The results were similar with the coefficients for
TAC and WESTPOL being positive, while the coefficients for
INTBUS, SOVPOL, and SOP were negative.
The overall model
was statistically significant with a F-value of 4.756
(prob. = .0003). In addition, like the logistic analysis,
TAC and INTBUS were the only significant variables in the
model.
However, the key fact is that the Soviet joint
venture model does help explain cooperation in the
liberalization of Soviet-Western political economy.

177

VITA
E. Perry Ballard

Department of Social Science
Berry College
Rome, GA 30149
(404) 232-5374

1347 Redmond Circle, H-3
Rome, GA 30165
(404) 232-7254

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Birth Date:

August 22, 1957

EDUCATION

A.B.D.

Louisiana State University (Ph.D. Expected, August 1991)
Major:

First Field-International Politics
Area: International Political Economy
Second Field-Comparative Politics
Area: Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
Communist Systems, Third World
(Latin American and the Middle East)
Dissertation: Cooperation in the
Liberalization of Soviet-Western Trade:
A Transaction-Cost Analysis of Soviet
Joint Ventures with the West

Minor:

Economics
Area: International Trade and Finance

University of Kentucky (1987-1988)
M.A.

Mississippi State University (1986)
Major:
Minor:

International and Comparative Politics
History

Thesis: A Study of the Impact of the Soviet Military
on the Soviet Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process
B.A.

Southeastern Louisiana University (1984)
Major:
Minor:

History and Government
Business Administration

178

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Current:

Assistant Professor
Department of Social Science
Berry College
Rome, GA 30161

1990-1991:

Assistant Professor (One Year Appointment)
Department of Political Science
Memphis State University
Memphis, TN 38152

1988-1990:

Graduate Editorial Assistant
Journal of Politics
Department of Political Science
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803

1987-1988:

Teaching Assistant
Department of Political Science
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

1987-1988:

Instructor/Part-Time
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences
Lexington Community College
Lexington, KY 40506

1986-1987:

Visiting Assistant Professor
Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences
Jefferson Community College
Louisville, KY 40202

1986-1987:

Instructor/Part-Time
Department of History and Political Science
Bellarmine College
Louisville, KY 40205

1985-1986:

Research and Teaching Assistant
Department of Political Science
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, MS 39762

180

PUBLICATIONS, CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION, AND RESEARCH
1991:

"Soviet Foreign Policy in the Gorbachev Era:
Post-Realist Explanation of State Action."
Paper prepared for delivery at the annual
meeting of the Southern Political Science
Association, Atlanta, Georgia (November).
Forthcoming, Southeastern Political Review.

A

1991:

"Imperial Overstretch or Bound to Lead?
A Transaction-Cost Analysis of American
Hegemony." Paper prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, Illinois (April).

1990

"A Transaction-Cost Analysis of Soviet Joint Ventures with
the West: Cooperation in the Liberalization of East-West
Trade?" Submitted to Comparative Political Studies.
Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association-South, Memphis Tennessee
(November).

1990:

"Why a Capitalist Theory of Socialist Democratization?
The Relation of Economic Restructuring to Democratization
in the Soviet Union." Submitted to Comparative Politics.

1989:

"Cooperation in the Liberalization of International
Trade: International Regimes or Transaction-Cost Economics?"
Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, Memphis, Tennessee (November).

1989:

Panel Discussant: "Socialist States in the Global
Economy." American Political Science Association,
Atlanta, Georgia (September).

1989:

"Gorbanomics, Global Interdependence, and Soviet Foreign
Economic Policy: Peredyshka or Perestroika?" Prepared
for delivery at the annual meeting of the Southwestern
Political Science Association, Little Rock, Arkansas
(April).

1988:

"New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Economic Policy: An
Analysis of the Soviet Union's Integration into the
International Political Economy." Prepared for delivery
at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association-South, Atlanta, Georgia (November).

1988:

Panel Discussant: "Soviet Intelligence: The Role of
Surrogate Services." International Studies Association,
St. Louis, Missouri (March).

181

1988:

"New Thinking and Soviet Third World Policy: Old
Rigidities or Radical Transformation?" Prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the International
Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri (March).

COURSES TAUGHT

American Foreign Policy
American Government
Comparative Politics
International Political Economy
International Politics
Latin American Politics
Middle Eastern Politics
Seminar in International Politics
Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy
Theories and Concepts of International Politics
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

American Political Science Association
International Studies Association
International Studies Association-South
Midwest Political Science Association
Southern Political Science Association
Southwestern Political Science Association
UNIVERSITY SERVICE

1990-1991:

Faculty Advisor, Pi Sigma Alpha, Department of
Political Science, Memphis State University.
Faculty Advisor, College Democrats,
Memphis State University.

1988-1990:

President, Graduate Student Association, Department
of Political Science, Louisiana State University.

1986-1987:

Prison Education Program, Jefferson Community
College, Louisville, Kentucky.

NON-ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

Administrative Assistant/Accounting Assistant
March 1987-August 1987
Container Corporation of American
Louisville, KY
Planner/Scheduler/Administrative Assistant
May 1984-July 1985, September 1979-July 1981
Allied Chemical
Geismar, LA
Draftsman/Administrative Specialist
August 1975-July 1979
United State Air Force
Andersen AFB, Guam and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming
REFERENCES
Dr. Peter Zwick, Chairman
Department of Political Science
California State University, San Marcos
San Marcos, CA 92069-1477
Dr. Eugene Wittkopf
Department of Political Science
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
Dr. Ron Weber, Co-Editor
Journal of Politics
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53201
Dr. T. David Mason
Department of Political Science
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, MS 39762
Dr. James Garand
Department of Political Science
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:

M ajor Field:

Elza Perry Ballard

Political Science

T itle o f D issertation:

Cooperation in the Liberalization of Soviet-Western Trade? A
Transaction-Cost Analysis of Soviet Joint Ventures with the
West

Approved:

Major-EcoLessor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAM INING C O M M ITTEE:

Co-Chair

Date of Examination:

July 8, 1991

